

Łukasz Młyńczyk\*

## **Political cognition. Can scientific paradigms change cognitive status of anti-Semitism and the Holocaust in the history of the Jewish people?**

**KEYWORDS:** anti-Semitism, Holocaust, political cognition, Jews, paradigm

**SŁOWA KLUCZOWE:** antysemityzm, Holocaust, polityka poznania, Żydzi, paradygmat

### **Introduction**

The purpose of this article is to look at selected positions devoted to issues of historical experience of the Jewish people for their research strategy and their corresponding or lack of dominant research paradigms. I will therefore assume idealizationally that the main methodological model for the study of the Jewish people is subsumption under the general cognitive imperative, at the head of which there are Holocaust and anti-Semitism, as universal cognitive keys. The basic intention is to indicate the path of political science to know the history of the nation, through limited exemplification<sup>1</sup> as a response to the absolutization of the research results before they are published to be limited exclusively to the study of the Jews, as the people especially experienced by the history, which enforces appropriate research approaches. If we reduce the judgment of contemporary phenomena and problems concerning the Jews to the stereotypical anti-Semitism, then any knowledge does not make much sense, because everything important is explained and closed in one cause. Something else is identifying antipathy as an act of anti-Semitism, and quite something else its formal manifestation. On the basis

---

\* Associate Professor, Institute of Political Science, Faculty of Humanities, University of Zielona Góra. Mail: lookasm@poczta.onet.pl.

<sup>1</sup> See: H. Arendt, *Eichmann w Jerozolimie. Rzecz o banalności zła*, Kraków 1987; *Ibidem, Koczowanie totalitaryzmu*, Warszawa 2014; R. Hilberg, *Zagłada Żydów Europejskich*, volumns I-III, Warszawa 2014; P. Śpiewak, *Żydokomuna: interpretacje historyczne*, Warszawa 2012; Sh. Sand, *Kiedy wynaleziono naród żydowski*, Warszawa 2013 [ebook].

of science, you can examine any antipathy towards minorities alike, and if we assume a separate code for the Jews, then we forget that the function of science is discovering, not decreeing the result. There is no provocation in it, but these are only strict scientific rules, notwithstanding the fact that they may cause such effects of tension. Important, therefore, it would be the fact that the experiences of the Jewish people to a large extent determine the actual research about them, especially at the level of reception of presented scientific judgments. In this context we do not say about the situation when we reduce the Holocaust and anti-Semitism to frivolous determinants of the fate of the Jews, but about allegations of insignificance research, when there will not be such references. The rating itself in science, equally concerning research any nationality, and more broadly, every social phenomenon is non-scientific. In terms of cognition, rating of evaluations is not subject to scientific judgment, because in its assumptions it is neither true nor false. Such scholars as Hannah Arendt and Raul Hilberg opposed to the methodological dictate to investigate the fate of the Jews strictly adhering to the political and legitimate categories of analysis. They pointed to other phenomena, sometimes drawing a different, and sometimes opposite perspectives.

The primary function of science is cognition which is expressed in specific pursuit of the truth. Of course, like any field of social development it is subject to strong political influence. In this way, the new research sub-disciplines are born. Some of them have already found their place in the social sciences and humanities by focusing on research on the politics of memory and historical policy.

### **The trap of paradigms**

Deciding on the selection of theoretical tools for the analysis of the problem in the first place we need to remember about the conflict of truth and being right, and the particle and the whole. The first attempt the researcher faces is to isolate the problem, having the scientific character and separation of what may be the subject of pseudo-scientific reflection. Initially we do not know whether we are dealing with scientification of what is speculative, or perhaps quite unexpectedly, we have discovered a new “butterfly effect”. It should be mentioned that at the stage of writing it is difficult to decide who / what will become the main character of the description. It is a secondary matter. While we always know what is a necessary element of a scientific text. This is always theory and along with it also metatheory. We tend to treat everything “on trust”. The writing process is not just using all the available literature (often from the browser), although the creation of the theory without the knowledge of what happened is more than risky, because it can lead to identical and/or no conclusions. In other words, we do not knock

at the open door. Of course, there is some scientific per mill of people who have the ability to see relationships and dependencies never before observed. Unfortunately, the consciousness whether possibly you belong to this group will come after relevant experience. We often forget that what we have to say is not important, as long as we do not prove that it can be ever said. The starting point is to familiarize with the achievements on the theory of what is connected with our research. An inherent part of the study is to refer to the theory and develop the methodology. The correct order of the questions should look like: what? how? why? and again: what? This sequence can not have any exceptions. The denial to any of them invalidates the others. To understand this we need to look broader at the issue of paradigm. According to Thomas Kuhn:

„[paradigm – Ł.M.] [...] I mean to suggest that some accepted examples of actual scientific practice—examples which include law, theory, application, and instrumentation together—provide models from which spring particular coherent traditions of scientific research. These are the traditions which the historian describes under such rubrics as ‘Ptolemaic astronomy’ (or ‘Copernican’), ‘Aristotelian dynamics’ (or ‘Newtonian’), ‘corpuscular optics’ (or ‘wave optics’), and so on. The study of paradigms, including many that are far more specialized than those named illustratively above, is what mainly prepares the student for membership in the particular scientific community with which he will later practice. Because he there joins men who learned the bases of their field from the same concrete models, his subsequent practice will seldom evoke overt disagreement over fundamentals.”<sup>2</sup>.

Kuhn acknowledged that a number of active researchers, who thus form a very characteristic pattern of the study, accumulate within the problem. Determination of theories, concepts or laws is not the primary feature of a paradigm<sup>3</sup>. It is not therefore treated in a strictly standard way. The author sees its leading value in the achievements of that environment. So something, what underwent intersubjective verification. While research work has some advantages of the game for itself, the consequences (results) are not just fun for the fun. Everything that goes into scientific circulation is subjected to predetermined procedures of incorporation and evaluation. We can not escape from this. The beginning of our efforts is to reject conspiracy theories and look at the phenomenon through the issues known in the methodology of science. It will allow looking primarily at the procedures that were once developed as a consequence of scientific knowledge. It is not about pure expertise, because this is always burdened with the look and the reason of the person issuing an expert assessment.

Procedures therefore give us freedom from not taking the issue, because those we think are obvious. In this point, paradigm replaces taking everything on trust. Therefore, we can find postmodern function of science in the quest to create a paradigm, not to explain it as such. The dream is to be in the mainstream of science. We do not know

<sup>2</sup> T. S. Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolution*, Chicago 1970, pp. 10-11.

<sup>3</sup> T. S. Kuhn, *Struktura rewolucji naukowych*, Warszawa 2009, p. 33.

whether this is the right goal, however if you accept conditionality of any theory, it is often tempting to be on the side of the popular judgment of reality. The evidence here is sometimes blatant disparity between these proposing original theories and those whose purpose is to question the novelties. Francis Fukuyama learned about that writing about *the end of history*<sup>4</sup>, Samuel P. Huntington got to know about it speaking about *the clash of civilizations*<sup>5</sup> or Richard Dawkins writing about *God Delusion*<sup>6</sup>. A gross mistake of the critics was the lack of reference to the rules of the methodology and empirical verification (except maybe Dawkins's theory), then they would have given their speeches a scientific status, and so we had at most a doctrinaire dispute. The criticism was based mainly on a different understanding of reality, resulting from superficial observation, wherein the facts result from the hypothetical, not realistic vision of reality<sup>7</sup>. The main advantage of paradigm in the social sciences is its irrefutability. It can not be revoked; it becomes temporarily more or less useful. If social theories considered false (and this can not be stated categorically!) further inflame emotions of the consecutive seeking, we can only call like Mr. Jourdain – “Long live science!”.

Each academic position tends to build paradigmatic framework. The main part of these frameworks is to develop such a *modus vivendi* that will contain a network of conceptual propositions and research problems, and then there is a chance to develop a grid of theoretical connections, used to define the political life<sup>8</sup>. The paradigm is a kind of a ticket to the world of science, which guarantees constant support and rooting. Further, there is a need to accept the fact that any social human activities take place within approved rules. The rules alone do not determine our behavior so much, as they can give them a specific meaning<sup>9</sup>. Intersubjectivity is like playing poker, eventually someone will check what card we have, because every bluff brings only short-term benefits. Obviously, bluff in science does not mean simply that we have to deal with fraud. In the environment of scientists, it is much more difficult to scare the other side, because they may not be a real opponent. However, the paradigm is not a direct set of rules. Creating any model of research in science must be based on the assumption that a certain set of rules has been accepted as a permanent achievement of science, not on the rules as such<sup>10</sup>. Therefore, it is necessary to have some research knowledge,

<sup>4</sup> F. Fukuyama, *Koniec historii*, Kraków 2009.

<sup>5</sup> S. P. Huntington, *Zderzenie cywilizacji i nowy kształt ładu światowego*, Warszawa 2001.

<sup>6</sup> R. Dawkins, *Bóg urojony*, Warszawa 2007.

<sup>7</sup> Cf. K. Jodkowski, *Nienaukowy fundament nauki*, [in:] Z. Pietrzak (red.), *Granice nauki*, „Lectioes & Acroases Philosophicae” 2013, vol. VI, nr 1, pp. 89-90.

<sup>8</sup> T. Klementewicz, *Rozumienie polityki. Zarys metodologii nauki o polityce*, Warszawa 2011, p. 59.

<sup>9</sup> A. Grobler, *Metodologia nauk*, Kraków 2006, p. 229.

<sup>10</sup> Cf. T. S. Kuhn, *Struktura rewolucji...*, pp. 85-89.

but also scientific intuition<sup>11</sup> relating to the possibility of implementing such a model, but it can only be based on a thorough examination and become familiar with the theory of science. Therefore, our world has its habits that are a constitutive element for it. Scientists have a natural ability to create a dual system of the world, what must be understandable, because it is, first of all, the opposition to the state of ignorance. The empirical and normative positions today are the first level of self-identification in political science. However, emerging contradictions should be eliminated for progress, and this is a function of scientific cognition. Tadeusz Klementewicz believes that the highest level of generality, for which a political scientist can climb up as a researcher of modern times, is a historical generality (chronicler)<sup>12</sup>. However, this conclusion can be set against another one. Moving away from the Puritan catalog of rules of methodological and theoretical schools allows you to build a theory of what is experienced on a relatively high level of generality. We have a relatively rich choice in the political science research. K. von Beyme mentions such approaches: historical, institutional, behavioral, functionalist and rational choice<sup>13</sup>. Of course, in a broader context, you can also reach for the whole resource of methodology of social sciences. Nevertheless, the largely model-hypothetical approach is open to modifications, allowing retracing the whole range of motivations, accompanying people throughout the political and social activity. They are not a guarantee of appearance of hard statistical (quantitative) data, but science is primarily a dispute about the legitimacy and necessity. A historical approach is largely the control of the facts. Rating them from the perspective of time does not necessarily guarantee a perfect explanation. The empirical methodology does not mean only the adaptation of ad hoc solutions, because thanks to current explanation we make additions in the area of paradigm, so we run all the intersubjective machinery, forcing the scientific tissue to hard work. In this situation, historical generalization is just cleaning up after the play, a kind of scientific inventory. Apparently the order appears, but with no guarantee that you can spread the tested categories. If we all act in a dynamic reality, no study stops the movement even for a moment. Therefore, all the generalizations are in the same way of primary importance. Example: a political scientist finds that the state institutions in times of crisis do not have the ability to create democracy, but to reduce it. Then the historian examines it in the area of available to him data about the crises, generalizing the previous statement. This means, however, that he was not able to go beyond the scope presented in real time. Hence, he generalized nothing in this case. Let us look at this issue from the positions that few regard scientific. Let us try to forget for a moment that the film as part of the artistic output

<sup>11</sup> See: A. Nałczadźjan, *Intuicja a odkrycia naukowe*, Warszawa 1979, *passim*.

<sup>12</sup> T. Klementewicz, *op. cit.*, p. 61.

<sup>13</sup> See: K. von Beyme, *Współczesne teorie polityczne*, Warszawa 2005.

does not meet the formal rigor of scientific work. Jacek Borcuch, the director of the famous film *Everything I love* (*Wszystko, co kocham*), decided to make a picture not quite set in a vision of the era<sup>14</sup>. Apparently in the background there is all what the average Pole associates with the year 1981, however, from the assumption what determines young people, at the same time does not completely determines their lives. In other words, a historical event, which we assign some far-reaching significance, in fact may not possess the generalizing features, in a situation when people focus their attention on the objects recognized by them as closer and they treat them in a principle way. There are also obvious disadvantages. In such a situation the naivety of our superficial observation can be revealed, as Karl Popper indicated, emphasizing that the reporting information from their own experience virtually will lead us nowhere. Individual experiences are, of course, an important component of the knowledge of the period, but they themselves do not create even a strict scientific knowledge, which is often forgotten by empiricists.

Personal observations are located in every possible historical period. In other words, not everything can be generalized with the use of the historical generalization. The point is not that some radically new understanding exists thanks to that, but the fact that there are reasons for subplots (human lives), and they equally claim the right to the truth. Such an explanation inherently idiographic, allows for reaching the state of understanding the history<sup>15</sup>, but does not pretend to versatility. In this way, as in science, it can not be said that theories interpreting the same phenomenon must be radically converge and this is just the place for coincidence of explanations. Different individual understandings of experiences coexist, commonly regarded as an explanation. They do not create a paradigm, because in fact the personal experience or relationship of national identity itself do not imply acceptance of the settled pattern, but only the demand for shared understanding of history. Their advantage, however, is the attempt to reevaluate existing generalizations that we can manage to make not so much the analysis of emotional states, but just the explanation that has a scientific status. They will not be a generalization or universal theorem about the reality.

The trap of paradigms is their inevitability in the context of research, also in social sciences, so for political scientists as well. Paradigm can also be a surprise for scientists too liberally referring to it. This is partly due to the lack of a precise definition of property for the purposes of its later use. Therefore, researches are trying to expand it to, scientificating their observations, remain among certain well-established traditions<sup>16</sup>. Then declared affiliation replaces the formal qualifications.

<sup>14</sup> *Wszystko, co kocham*, dir. J. Borcuch, prod. Polska 2009.

<sup>15</sup> Cf. J. Topolski, *Rozumienie historii*, Warszawa 1978, p. 16.

<sup>16</sup> E. Mokrzycki, *Do nauki przychodzi się nie tylko z pytaniami*, Warszawa 2007, p. 101.

## (Non)banality of Hannah Arendt's theory

Under the above you can refer to the essence of statements about the fate of the Jewish people. Hannah Arendt already at the beginning of her deliberations on the roots of the two greatest twentieth-century totalitarianisms states:

“Nazism, even without antisemitism, would have been the deathblow to the existence of the Jewish people in Europe; to consent to it would have meant suicide, not necessarily for individuals of Jewish origin, but for the Jews as a people”<sup>17</sup>.

This kind of remark must be considered as an appropriate cognitive context, since the useful nature of the Jews, which was losing its importance before World War II, makes sense when people repeat an argument about their elastic behaviors, manifested in subordination to the rules of the countries in which they settled. It is worth pointing to the fact that the Jews were considered to be a Europe-wide element, and this was done on the basis of their public activities, where usability and individual, rather than political loyalty, were a natural factor of identification of Semitic qualities<sup>18</sup>. However, at the level of conventional policies, the problem of anti-Semitism was understood differently than Arendt wanted to see:

“Arendt strongly objected to the suggestion of a symbiotic relation between the anti-Semite and the Jew because of its pernicious consequences. To claim that the Jew is someone who is defined as a Jew by others is to present the mirror image of what the Jewish parvenu so desperately wants to believe. In the parvenu's self-deceptive struggle to be accepted by the society that rejects him, he secretly hopes that others will no longer regard him as a Jew. If social anti-Semitism were to disappear (or at least no longer be directed against “exceptional Jews” like himself), then he would finally be free from experiencing the “shame” of being a Jew!”<sup>19</sup>”

Therefore, the essence of being a Jew for the Jews themselves based on persuading the world to their non-Jewish image, as long as they were “just statistical” citizens of the state. However, according to their opponents they created the potential ability to build a national community in a separate area, which in turn could result in the creation of the nation state *in statu nascendi*, when other national entities in Europe were falling.

Anti-Semitism, as a cognitive scheme of behaviors towards the Jewish nation, according to Arendt had a political rather than economic character. The elimination of anti-Semitism in the place of extensive armed struggle enabled the Jewish people organization of the, political in fact, resistance movement. It was not only to protect their

<sup>17</sup> H. Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, Cleveland-New York 1962, pp. 21-22.

<sup>18</sup> Cf: *ibidem*, pp. 22, 24, 26.

<sup>19</sup> R. J. Bernstein, *Hannah Arendt and the Jewish Question*, Cambridge (MA) 1996, p. 48.

own lives, but the fact that the Jews began to fight for the freedom of other Jews<sup>20</sup>. It can not be disputed that in the situation of an objective and universal threat of existence political identity was created, which was fed with specific cultural intimacy in a natural way. I mention this last term, since it shows, in my opinion, the essence of Jewish thinking about themselves. The concept of anti-Semitism dominates the conventional discourse, but it is a kind of methodological archetype that, under a gentlemen's agreement, is valid because of its importance in the history of the chosen people. Within issues of political anthropology, one could assume that the Jews should cultivate mainly an awareness of historical drama, which would move the border of the debate about them in the direction of actual sanctification of the divine chosen ones. In the temporal dimension, it would mean giving uniqueness to national characteristics, which would receive political interpretation. Any trivialization would meet with immediate scientific obstruction, as affecting cognitive compromise and dictate of form. Meanwhile, the determinants of history led to the opposite phenomenon, such as the development of their own stereotypes. It is necessary to mention the Israeli abruptness<sup>21</sup>. "These are autostereotypes that insiders express openly at the expense of their own community. Among minorities, their use needs to find a common denominator with the surrounding society, as in the case of the self-humiliating humor of the Jewish Diaspora making ironic moral pressure on local bystanders who understand all, and so they can adequately respond to it"<sup>22</sup>. A synthesis of this kind of thinking was a Hollywood film *Inglourious Basterds* by director Quentin Tarantino, where an alternative vision of the end of the era and Adolf Hitler was presented in a humorous form, where the fate of Fuehrer rested in the hands of militarized squad of American Jews. Hannah Arendt's considerations, for obvious reasons, did not reach popular culture, but it is worth pointing out that some abstract context can also be seen nowadays, though its strength is probably that it does not invalidate the category of anti-Semitism as a tool of analysis, and even becomes its literal, though still metaphorical justification.

Recalling the above examples is important in clarifying the right to formulate opinions by political theorists. Classic post-war work by Hannah Arendt *Eichmann in Jerusalem. A Report on the Banality of Evil*, is based on describing during the Holocaust a constitutive feature of behavior of the Jewish people. As for the author, on the one hand, it did not meet with an attempt to understand her lecture, under specifically conceived self-reflection, but on the other one, it faced the accusations, which could be qualified as a format of charges of treason. Part of the explanation was probably

<sup>20</sup> H. Arendt, *Polityczna organizacja narodu żydowskiego. Artykuły z „Aufbau”, kwiecień 1944 – kwiecień 1945*, [in:] *Eadem, Pisma żydowskie*, Warszawa 2012, p. 227.

<sup>21</sup> Cf: M. Herzfeld, *Zażyłość kulturowa: poetyka społeczna w państwie narodowym*, Kraków 2007, pp. 15-16. See also: H. Jacobson, *The Finkler Question*, London 2010.

<sup>22</sup> M. Herzfeld, *op. cit.*, p. 15.



the fact that the phenomenon of Jewish nationalism increased, in connection with the achievement of statehood by the Jews since 1948, actually meaning the awaited state of obtaining a Jewish homeland<sup>23</sup>. You can at this point refer to the concept expressed by Karl R. Popper in the second volume of *The Open Society and Its Enemies*. His critique of Hegelianism, supported by the Jewish origin of his parents, as well as the forced pre-war emigration, based on the belief that, in fact, historicist concept of nationalism by Hegel, according to which the state was the embodiment of the Spirit (Blood) the self creating nation (or race), builds an ultimately closed and hostile social model<sup>24</sup>. The nation was intended for world domination, while the state in a totalitarian order was utilitarian in nature to its core values. In the face of these words, it is difficult for even the conceptual equating of Jewish nationalism with its counterparts. Jewish statehood in principle does not mean special status, because it was somehow forced by historical and political circumstances, when nations formed the modern states, the fate of the nation without territory had to be foregone, because assimilation processes, other than a complete rejection of their own identity, were hindered. Achieving the institutional defense of constitutive national characteristics, in the form of a separate area, indivisible entity, separated from the other with a boundary line, was a necessary condition of nationality as the expression of a particular form. Arendt concluded that “[...] the nation may be somewhere minority only if it is a majority elsewhere. You can not get around this fact with tricks like announcing Jewish a minority *par excellence*”<sup>25</sup>. When making a synthesis of the views of these two Jewish thinkers we get an explanation of the essence of national aspirations of Jews, as not only the effect of the trauma of the Holocaust, but just as non-alternative in the first half of the twentieth century coercion of nationalization of their national essence. It is an open question whether Israel was conceived as being to protect and store inalienable Jewish identity, whether it was forced to such defense by the experiences of extermination and complex geopolitical system in which it was located. The essence of the debate about national identity of the Jews is based on valuation, Manichaeism qualification of these problems, where evil must continually be eliminated by good. At the same time, even in relation to the issue of Zionism some cognitively defined mobility of the evil is clearly visible, because the Jews are actually under constant threat. Escaping from the consequences of the policy of the Nazi *Endlösung der Judenfrage*, they got to a place dominated by Arab nations and the Allies limited their expectations towards the Jewish state to protect

<sup>23</sup> Cf. H. Arendt, *Polityczna organizacja narodu żydowskiego...*, p. 228.

<sup>24</sup> Cf. K. R. Popper, *Spółczesność otwarte i jego wrogowie, tom 2: wysoka fala prorocत्व: Hegel, Marks i następcy*, Warszawa 2006, pp. 79-80.

<sup>25</sup> H. Arendt, *Problem mniejszości: na podstawie listu do Ericha Cohn-Bendita z lata 1940 roku*, [in:] *Eadem, Pisma żydowskie...*, p. 143.

their own interests in the Middle East, which then had to be pro Arabians<sup>26</sup>. So state-building actions of Jews were late for Arendt, because they reproduced historical necessities then. However the war itself changed the way of thinking about Europe and the nation-states, anachronistic in the sense of the political system, because the only, as it then seemed, solution was to place national minorities within the structure of the state in such a way that no one was favored<sup>27</sup>. It seems important to indicate that there must have been, however, some other social binder, as in the case of the aforementioned by coming from the German pre-war left a legendary professor at New York University, Soviet Russia. It directs us towards attempts to define nationality, which is not the purpose of this article. In terms of this issue as a political phenomenon, it is important to capture properly its cognitive qualification. It is known that the term nationalism – close in meaning to nationality – was and is strongly conditioned by its use by the Nazis and fascists in Europe. In such extent, the intentional use of the concept of Jewish nationalism was developing the political significance, to associate it unambiguously in a positive way, as an expression of redress the Jews for the tragedy of years 1933-1945.

Let us return to the essence of the issues signaled in advance and presented in the scientific reportage from the trial of Adolf Eichmann. Arendt indicated that the mere act of accusation was specific, because it did not refer to the perpetrator's acts, but to the suffering of the Jewish people. Therefore, it eliminated the need to include the cases of extermination of other nations to the mentioned indictment, and thus legitimized the jurisdiction of the Israeli court<sup>28</sup>. While it was justified from the point of view of fairness of the process in which the court addressed only the issue of crimes against the nation, currently represented by the state of Israel, so much problematic is to deprive other countries the possibility of the same judgment, once Eichmann was executed under the adjudicated death penalty. The fact that the death penalty as the highest one satisfies the need for reparation for the crimes does not legitimize that. In this perspective, in fact they acknowledged only the sole priority of that one who captured the criminal, making the particular decision and the validity of the axiological superiority of one nation at the expense of the suffering of another, enhancement of which was also the indisputable scale of the tragedy. Characterizing prosecutor Hausner's style of thinking the author wrote, "like almost everyone in Israel, he believed that only a Jewish court could render justice to Jews, and that the judgment on the enemies of the Jewish people is a matter of the Jews"<sup>29</sup>. The legal semantics had deep political jus-

---

<sup>26</sup> Cf: *Eadem, Kryzys syjonizmu, ibidem*, pp. 390-393.

<sup>27</sup> Cf: R. J. Bernstein, *op. cit.*, p. 11.

<sup>28</sup> Cf: H. Arendt, *Eichmann w Jerozolimie: rzecz o banalności zła*, Kraków 1987, pp. 9-10.

<sup>29</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 10.

tification, because it is worth noting that at the outbreak of World War II, the largest crime under international law was acting against the peace, and for this act, none of the litigants was convicted before the Court in Nuremberg. “The notion that aggression is “the supreme international crime” was silently abandoned when a number of men were sentenced to death who had never been convicted of a “conspiracy” against peace<sup>30</sup>. Similarly, it was not possible to apply the clause of crimes against humanity, when the court as well as the victims were qualified as part of the national paradigm. In the case of the Jerusalem court, the recognized crimes had detailed topography, because in the person of Eichmann it was possible to reproduce and extract that precisely. So he was tried in a state that did not exist during the Second World War, for crimes that had not been defined in the international law at that time and the geographical scope of his criminal activity at no time covered the territory of the new state of Israel. Referring to the assumptions about *art of punishment* made by Michel Foucault, we can indicate that consistently aiming for the most immediate depriving Eichmann of life must have been based on the belief that capital punishment would satisfy the need for compensation to each of the individual for the suffering of war. Nevertheless, Foucault argued, after all, that not the height and violence of the penalties (short suffering at the execution), but just forcing the guilty to pay for the real harm done is severe<sup>31</sup>. The death penalty in this particular process was not to be, however, the redemption of guilt towards the Jews, but likely giving them justice under the exclusive right to prosecute and convict Adolf Eichmann according to their will, as the person responsible for crimes against the Jewish people. It was therefore rather about the political motivations of the process, which were determined by the national stigma, and not the settlement of evil as such. It is difficult to assume that in the District Court in Jerusalem, any single victim of Shoah could be combined with a possible deprivation of life of the war torturer. Adolf Eichmann, even though his life basically meant nothing for the judging people, however, in axiological terms he embodied symbolism, which had to be politically and historically condemned. Stating qualification of the effect of the process as an expression of justice expressed literally “death for death” is a certain analytical abuse. A more accurate explanation seems the function of deconstruction of all the crime that the perpetrator embodied. The real punishment was the fact that the prosecutor brought the accused to achieve a state of abandonment of the right of evaluation, justifying, and ultimately defending his own life. He was deprived of the right to anything. It is a parallel description made by Arendt, evoking the words of one of the former prisoners of Buchenwald: actions of the Nazis meant the pursuit of

<sup>30</sup> H. Arendt, *Eichmann in Jerusalem: a Report of the Banality of Evil*, New York 1965, p. 257.

<sup>31</sup> Cf. M. Foucault, *Nadzorować i karać: narodziny więzienia*, Warszawa 2009, pp. 105-106.

the situation when the tortured victim voluntarily went to the scaffold, without protest, ultimately renouncing their own identity<sup>32</sup>. This resulted in the same way, but this time the roles were reversed. It was not, of course, relevant to the political effect of the process that Eichmann was indisputably guilty. Moreover, his mere presence and role during the Wannsee Conference<sup>33</sup> had to be his only explanation for the guilt. In addition, he was not tortured by the Jews, and under certain conditions he built anew his history, creating his own pitaval. Jews were granted the right to judge, which was not certainly a retaliatory action. An act of justice even if someone would call it a legitimate revenge, did not equalize at any point the former victims with their tormentors. It did not lead to compensation, but only in a manner deafened the conscience of Europe, the witness of the events that no one was able to justify in any circumstance. Probably the death penalty meant too low for such a war criminal like the former SS-Obersturmbannführer. In this dimension, naturalistic proceeding of the process of Nazi murderer was confronted by Arendt's with the controversial thesis of *the banality of evil*. For clarity and unity of reception, it was after all important to demonstrate specific features of the dehumanized monster and the environment, which he represented at the time of World War II. "In the process it became clear to her that Eichmann was not mad or not significantly different from the rest of the people. He was pretty ordinary"<sup>34</sup>. So a German-Jewish political theorist made political interpretation of the classic psychological experiment nowadays of Asch (1955) and Milgram (1961 to 1962), indicating that the most common feature of social behavior is conformity<sup>35</sup>. In turn, the British professor of developmental psychopathology Simon Baron-Cohen suspects that a potential explanation can be found in the area of the reduced level of empathy<sup>36</sup>. Researches from the borderline of political theory and psychological theory meet at this point. Arendt argued that Eichmann was the man without imagination, unable to murder a superior to take his place, but humbly performing his will. He could not understand the consequences of his actions, as opposed to the standard sanity, he was not able to identify his act as morally wrong. He built his biography during the war, but he did not treat the circumstances as an exceptional situation, only as an objective obstacle to smooth achievement of his professional and social advancement, because the war by its nature generates many fundamental problems. Trivial problems of an average person did not fit perfectly to the process of the genocide of the Jewish people,

<sup>32</sup> Cf: H. Arendt, *Eichmann w Jerozolimie...*, p. 16.

<sup>33</sup> Cf: *Protokół narady w Wannsee*, <http://www.majdanek.com.pl/obozy/dokumenty/wannsee.html>, access on: 01.02.2016; Por. R. Hilberg, *Zagłada Żydów...*, tom II (continuous pagination), pp. 487-492.

<sup>34</sup> S. Baron-Cohen, *Teoria zła: o empatii i genezie okrucieństwa*, Sopot 2014, p. 147.

<sup>35</sup> Cf: *ibidem*, pp. 148-149.

<sup>36</sup> *Ibidem*, pp. 149-150.

and the presence of the main culprit in the dock was not the primary and only goal of the process, at least in a strictly axiological dimension.

Another issue was the behavior of the Jewish leaders, whom Arendt devoted much attention in the book. It is hard not to notice that the characteristic of general policy are self-organizing structures, selecting to the entities of apparent power, even in conditions of total enslavement. This was particularly evident in times of war deportation of Jews. Then people assigned meaning to the minimum privileges, even when the fate of a man is struck and doomed since the Jewish nationality itself meant for its holders the status equal to the deadly disease. It should be noted that the partial integrity of the Palestinian Jews or the Rothschild family did not result from their material position, but came from protector countries. Especially descriptions of Jewish Councils (*Judenrat*) brought the allegations to the author, as she emphasized, very reluctantly acknowledged by others, the situation of blurring the role of oppressors and the oppressed<sup>37</sup>. It is difficult to defend the claim that the accusing Arendt for her reportage revealed the specific features of the Jewish people. Analyzing the political motives of care about the image of the national community we can demonstrate a natural state of exhibiting the hostile features, absolutely coming from the outside, combined with quite frequent glorifying of their national virtues. Equally, pretty true is the statement that highly this reveals itself in the nations particularly experienced by fate, so examples of Jews and Poles will often coincide in many points.

### Methodology of Shoah

Life's work of Raul Hilberg, *The Destruction of the European Jews*, did not appear in the two countries most important for the twentieth-century fate of Jews: Israel and Poland, respectively until 2012 and 2014. Polish publisher, Piotr Stefaniuk, tries to explain the circumstances connected with this fact pointing to the specific rhythm of life of each generation, who find a need to know in their particular time<sup>38</sup>. The experiences of the Holocaust have taken their toll not only in a literal tragedy of millions of people, but also it organized the way of thinking about this event. Clearly, the political realities of communist era in Poland were not in favor of the publication of a position that maintaining great respect for the victims of the Shoah, focuses on a complex methodology of the Holocaust of European Jews. In some respects, the picture drawn by Hilberg describes efficacy and, although it may sound bad, preparation filled with professionalism of the course of *the final solution to the Jewish question*. It is, however, the evidence of

<sup>37</sup> Cf. H. Arendt, *Eichmann w Jerozolimie...*, pp. 154, 160-161, 366.

<sup>38</sup> P. Stefaniuk, *Noty do wydania polskiego*, [in:] R. Hilberg, *Zagłada Żydów Europejskich*, tom I, Warszawa 2014, p. iii.

scientific integrity of the author, and definitely not an attempt to rehabilitate the Nazis. The words of former Secretary of State of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Reich and co-founder of the Nuremberg Laws, Dr. Wilhelm Stuckart will be a valuable tool for the analysis. During the meeting at Wannsee he pointed to the wrong position, even represented in the structures of the Nazi Party, seeking to demonstrate the features describing Jews as “Untermenschen”. Stuckart recognized in the chosen nation signs of economy, extraordinary intelligence, mental acuity, which combined with the cherishing of literacy and analysis, could locate this nation high in the political hierarchy of European nations. Therefore, the legal solutions he proposed were to have the opposite effect of propaganda, because he accused them of arrogance, self-centeredness and self-serving, and the fact that “they rejected Christ”. His idea was therefore to build a real image of the Jew, to condemn it in the next step, for what the world was to “applaud them”, therefore Stuckart was a supporter of sterilization, not a chaotic murder, which certainly would be condemned by the whole world then<sup>39</sup>. Of course, as a result he did not mean anything other than the biological extermination of the nation, only the methods were different. In this perspective, you can also try to understand the fact of a late edition of *The Destruction of the European Jews* in Israel, because from the perspective of the Jews it was necessary to show the worst deeds of the Nazis, and implicitly properties representative for them on which there was historical evidence. However, this choice did not take into account the characteristics of the German people, having a universal value, but used for the purpose requiring condemnation. From Hilberg we know that the initial interest of Yad Vashem in the first edition of his work disappeared after Israeli historians read the manuscript. They accused him of having no recourse to the sources, which they imparted priority, prepared in Yiddish or Hebrew<sup>40</sup>. You could read the suggestion that his book was German, which was the scientific but not political advantage. In the case of Poland, motivations also had a strictly political character, since the Polish People’s Republic (PRL) remaining in the sphere of influence of the Soviet state took care of the cult of the anti-Nazi propaganda campaign expressed in the official form as the heroic work of the liberating Red Army. There could not even be a trace of the description which did not contain normative evaluations or did not fit into the accepted canon of thinking about the Nazis. Proposed by the American-Jewish scholar a different kind of historical hearing was politically inconvenient. In fact, Poland after 1989 almost hysterically treated printing and translation of *Mein Kampf*, which indicated the inability to separate the emotions from the historical evaluation

---

<sup>39</sup> See: *Ostateczne rozwiązanie [Conspiracy]*, dir. F. Pierson, prod. USA, Great Britain 2001; See: Dr. Wilhelm Stuckart – Biography, <https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/biography/Stuckart.html>; access on 20.02.2016.

<sup>40</sup> R. Hilberg, *Pamięć i polityka: droga historyka Zagłady*, Warszawa 2012, pp. 98-99.

of this program. Polish Constitution of 2 April 1997 equaled totalitarian Nazi, fascist and communist (par. 13), legitimizing a ban on the organizations functioning and referring to all the content. In practice of the Third Republic the dubious achievements of totalitarianisms have never been formally equal, because a lot of exceptions were made to the communist manifestos, which were included not only in popular culture, but also recently in the functioning of websites devoted to this subject<sup>41</sup>.

Hilberg, outlining in a sense a technocratic image of the Nazis saw their motivation in the political sphere and in the psychological background. Notably, the motives of Adolf Hitler's plan can be no undue harm described in a brief way, but the propaganda action itself used the narrative being shaped since the writings of Martin Luther<sup>42</sup>. Therefore, Hitler's propaganda used entrenched over the centuries stereotypes of the Jew, which had so much significance that it was a picture of a nation created in the pre-Enlightenment society. Probably the imaginary Jew, with all his faultless crimes, was for the then Christians an object of traditional conceptualization, serving the need for indicating the responsible for their own failures. In this sense, the otherness of the Jews was a very suggestive propaganda material. In this perspective, religious and scientific contexts, and common human phobias mingled. Then, the pace of change of the model Jew in German society only depended on the intensity of the information. The fate of the Jews was thus a foregone conclusion, and the scale of the recognition of the Nazi arguments matched the commitment in that extermination process.

The Jews were in general a highly developed society who took up a range of professions related to mental effort, which resulted largely from their religious traditions that shape social life itself. Among them there were artists, officials, managers, teachers and scientists, doctors and engineers, as well as bankers or old financiers, who had some business with the old European aristocracy<sup>43</sup>. One of the determinants of the development was a historical dictate of life in diasporas, because of which they were never at home (this circumstance, even if it was not a precondition, was certainly a sufficient condition for the occurrence of the Holocaust). As seen social flexibility of Jews undoubtedly was associated with the necessity to adapt to a variety of conditions and

<sup>41</sup> See for example the website „Komunistyczna Partii Polski” [Communist Party of Poland], <http://www.kompol.org/>, access on 01.02.2016. KPP in their opinion refers only to the ideology of the communist regime, and not to the totalitarian methods and practices. There is so much discussion that actually it is difficult to separate yourself from the influence of the legacy of political groups that relying on the ideas of communism based their actions on the use of terror. In this way, neo-fascist Poland parties should be allowed to function, assuming that they remain at the proclamation of the idea and not realize it in practice. What's more, par. 13 of the Constitution says about the prohibition of religious and nationality hatred. In such a situation, programmatic hatred should be considered, and certainly, reluctance of the left-wing parties to the nation-state as a non-binding with the fact that the subject of such a state is always a defined nation.

<sup>42</sup> Cf. R. Hilberg, *Zagłada Żydów...*, vol. I (continuous pagination), p. 13.

<sup>43</sup> Cf. H. Arendt, *Korzenie totalitaryzmu...*, pp. 73-74.

customs, for which the best survival strategy was to develop universal qualities needed in each national economy. The Jews, however, what was to be the cause of their immense tragedy, were not only paid labor force, but they distinguished by a number of qualities that rather would have situated them high in the European society devoid of Nazi madness. They were so often a social competition and a mental mirror of imperfections of European nations. They were persecuted for ethnic and religious reasons in the Reich, but in Palestine others pointed to their too ostentatious Germanization.

“As a result, a German Jew who came to Palestine in the thirties of the last century, made an impression of particularly non-Jewish on others. He was formally kind, punctual, immaculate, precise in every respect, with no sense of humor, serious, hardworking, and of higher education, an intellectual loving German literature, music and art. He was more German than Jewish”<sup>44</sup>.

Even Hannah Arendt faced this kind of allegations, whom they not only reminded closeness that united her with the eminent German (and shortly Nazi) thinker Martin Heidegger<sup>45</sup>, but also a sense of identification with undeniably outstanding culture and philosophy, but coming from a nation that legitimized the annihilation of the Jews.

Hilberg thought that the extermination of the Jews itself could not be just a common motive for people’s actions, who could only be said that they represented evil. The Holocaust became his cognitive obsession, being in fact a complex problem, as something more than murder in the conventional sense, being “a work” of extensive and very efficient bureaucracy<sup>46</sup>. Probably the nature of an inquisitive researcher led him to the need to eliminate coincidence from the actions of the Nazis. He argued that Hitler went away from street pogroms, because their character was difficult to control, and at the same time they were rather of low efficiency, except for the odium of fear that accompanied them<sup>47</sup>. Therefore, the quoted historian recognized the basic feature of political action, namely teleological rationality. Each political behavior is measured with effectiveness in relation to the intended objective, and to Hitler himself it was to achieve a final result. The essence of understanding was therefore to examine the whole, however Shoah had both the mass and individual nature, but the scale of the drama prevented parallel analysis that could be carried out in relation to the offender, meaning a key for Hilberg.

There is a certain parallelism between Arendt and Hilberg’s reasoning, and from the perspective of political science it is not so much important to indicate the author of the conclusion, in which each of them individually stated that bureaucrats were not

<sup>44</sup> K. Kłopotowski, *Geniusz Żydów na polski rozum*, Warszawa 2015, p. 264.

<sup>45</sup> See: H. Arendt, M. Heidegger, *Korespondencja z lat 1925-1975*, Warszawa 2010.

<sup>46</sup> R. Hilberg, *Pamięć i polityka...*, p. 52.

<sup>47</sup> Cf. *ibidem*, p. 58.



guided by hatred<sup>48</sup>. The coincidence seemingly can also be seen in the responsibility of the Judenrats, above described by the eminent political theorist, and in the memory of the Holocaust historian, who was to be convinced by the promoter to remove the statement from his dissertation: “[...] The Jews obeying ordinance, collaborated in their own destruction”<sup>49</sup>. Hilberg did not agree with this personal statement, because he was convinced that the behavior of the Judenrats can not be separated from the rest of the Jewish communities, as a common feature of people living in the ghettos was “[...] the accommodation and adaptation policy practiced by Jews for centuries”<sup>50</sup>. Describing his own biography, which was dominated by *vita pro opere*<sup>51</sup>, he revealed the backstage of mutual relationships with Arendt, or rather their absolute absence. He stressed his priority in constructing statements about the Nazis. The author of *Eichmann in Jerusalem* after the praise uttered at Hilberg in that book<sup>52</sup>, in a different place accused him of ignorance of the history of Germany, which resulted in the alleged constructing of his thesis on “the Jewish desire for death”<sup>53</sup>. I recall these events, because in my opinion they are a picture of the complexity of scientists’ lives and scientific knowledge. Undoubtedly, each research effort is accompanied by individual conviction of the importance of researches, which could be magnified in dealing with the subject of the Holocaust. Arendt was a recognized thinker, which had its German cognitive habits, while Hilberg, although he also emigrated from Europe, actually socialized only in the United States. Additionally, he applied a lot of attention for the sake of thoroughness and reach out to all possible Nazi sources, which in his opinion was not only the cognitive key, but the duty of every historiographer. However, the narrative itself is of a political science character because the author first and foremost is trying to create subjective and objective structure of political decisions. Both of them, though in different ways, sought to convince the public opinion to their version of history of the Holocaust. Each of them wanted their version to be original and constitute a closed research concept recapitulating the state of knowledge and research that had its apogee in their works. Unfolding of personality traits of both referenced authors or any gradation of their greatness seems to be too simple an explanation. Both accepted the thesis of the durability of the historical concept of Germany. They differed only in evaluation of the role of the Nazi era. For Arendt it was an episode between past and present, for Hilberg logical continuation of the past. In addition, the terms “second

---

<sup>48</sup> Cf. *ibidem*, p. 62; H. Arendt, *Eichmann w Jerozolimie...*, pp. 35, 39, 197.

<sup>49</sup> R. Hilberg, *Pamięć i polityka...*, p. 59.

<sup>50</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 136.

<sup>51</sup> *Ibidem*, the back part of the cover.

<sup>52</sup> H. Arendt, *Eichmann w Jerozolimie...*, p. 364.

<sup>53</sup> R. Hilberg, *Pamięć i polityka...*, pp. 140-141.

Germany” and “the other Germany” also appeared in the public discourse<sup>54</sup>. Some explanation for such a view could be Arendt’s academic position and popularity and her mental attachment to German philosophy and philosophers. On the other hand Hilberg draws his own biography as a life of an impecunious man working in an insignificant university, convincing the prominent world about the value of his work, which he had been creating for years. They made the effort to analyze the same issues, but they did not do this in the same way. Interestingly they were associated together, because they had become the subject of criticism because of the departure from the preferred form of studies on the Holocaust and Jewish heroism, which aspirationally was treated by the Jewish establishment as an integrated whole<sup>55</sup>. From a methodological point of view, we had to deal with the functionalist recognition (Hilberg), which contrasts the genetic approach (Arendt). In practice, this met with external denial and mutual animosity, despite the attempts to point to the advantages of both positions.

### **„Arbeit macht frei” – hypocritical false or bold meta-truth?**

The era of Nazism was rational only in terms of political theory, and only if such a concept is devoid of conditional normative assessments. The extermination of Jews in Auschwitz became therefore their immortality. On the other hand, acts of the Nazis provided them immortal guilt. I found the trace of the latter clues thanks to a Polish publisher of *the Extermination of European Jews*, who in 2013 published a theory political manifesto in the book edited by me<sup>56</sup>. Over the years, we have been associating the concentration camp in Auschwitz with the entry gate, over which there is the inscription “Work makes you free”<sup>57</sup>. The literal understanding of this assertion led us to read it as a vulgar and vicious deception, which is a manifestation of the Nazi hypocrisy. Moreover, there is no reason to argue with the fact that this work en masse drove to death from exhaustion. In fact, the cruel lie with all its consequences seems to be the only serious explanation, i.e. taking into account the fact that the gas chambers were to pretend showers, and Zyklon B a disinfectant. Nevertheless, the German idea remained ambiguous as a rule. Therefore, it can be assumed that this inscription meant an expression of individual motivations of Nazis themselves, who understood their commitment in the format of positive freedom, giving them the right to the act, which they did not have to judge as morally wrong, or constituting the superiority of

<sup>54</sup> Cf. T. Segev, *Siódmy Milion. Izrael – piętno Zagłady*, Warszawa 2012, pp. 21-22.

<sup>55</sup> Cf. R. Hilberg, *Pamięć i polityka...*, p. 137; H. Arendt, *Eichmann w Jerozolimie...*, pp. 365-366.

<sup>56</sup> Cf. P. Stefaniuk, *Teoria polityki*, [in:] *Aspekty metodologiczne oraz teoretyczne w subdyscyplinach politologii*, red. Ł. Młyńczyk, B. Nitschke, Toruń 2013, pp. 307-318.

<sup>57</sup> That inscription was also in other Nazi camps.

Hegelian's entity of history<sup>58</sup>. "He argued strongly for [Hegel – ed. LM] positive freedom (or positive liberty). He was right in the fact that the process of growing freedom is the synonymous with the development of more and more mature, complex forms of social organization, and actually the political one"<sup>59</sup>. Then Stefaniuk passes to dialectical explanation: "for understanding Hegel's conception of freedom it is necessary to perceive the consistency of these behaviors, or notice the fact that defending the state, he defended the foundation and guarantee of freedom"<sup>60</sup>. The organization of the Third Reich, which can be found in Hilberg's study on the Holocaust, was this Hegelian state of growing to perfection<sup>61</sup>, which in practice meant the growth of "freedom to." Stefaniuk further states that "[...] work creates history, and that freedom is conducive to its productivity, thus it becomes a tool of history, an instrument of exploitation of the potential of the individual. In this sense, it does not serve him, but the spirit of progress, that is the wider culture"<sup>62</sup>. It should be noted that the author does not make any excuse for Nazi deeds. He shows only that freedom within the meaning of political theory is neutral axiologically. The essence and purpose of the concentration camps was the biological destruction of the prisoners. The only important thing for Nazis, as described by Hilberg, was the pace and effectiveness of activities, so surely death of starvation as a result of forced labor was not the right tool for the final solution<sup>63</sup>, but also to some extent the work was part of economic use of concentration camps<sup>64</sup>. The issue of work can be seen in the context of Arendt's claims about *the banality of evil*, referring it to the perpetrators, not the victims. From the Nazis' point of view, and only from the perspective the individual image and experience of freedom fell within an action, which, however, from the non-Nazi position was certainly not neutral. Thus, the most bestial Nazis work was a reflection of the attainment of the state of freedom, as a consequence of containing a previous form, and the whole only then formed a new political organization. It is difficult to verify the hypothesis that the famous inscription in Auschwitz was a manifestation of insolence and the superiority of the Nazis, who created the logo of their own crime. Hegel assumed that the freedom of the world in Germany was creating an unlimited ownership of the fate of a free man, remaining so even when he did what he liked<sup>65</sup>. Probably in Nazi-rationalist belief history had

<sup>58</sup> Cf. *ibidem*, p. 316.

<sup>59</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 314.

<sup>60</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>61</sup> This view was negated by Karl Popper in his analysis of Hegel's historicism. Cf. K. R. Popper, *op. cit.*, pp. 46-47.

<sup>62</sup> P. Stefaniuk, *Teoria polityki...*, p. 315.

<sup>63</sup> Cf. R. Hilberg, *Zagłada Żydów...*, (paginacja ciągła) vol I, pp. 162-166; 293-307; *ibidem*, vol. III, pp. 1114-1140; 1198-1211.

<sup>64</sup> Por. *ibidem*, (continuous pagination) vol. III, pp. 1141-1162.

<sup>65</sup> G.W.F. Hegel, *Wykłady o filozofii dziejów*, Warszawa 2003, p. 211.

reached a point where a political organization was completed. Although it is possible to explain this phenomenon, it is difficult following Hilberg's doubts to try to understand it conventionally. "Sensing marriage of freedom and evil intuition found a terrible confirmation"<sup>66</sup>.

### Parallel political reality

An assertion of Jews themselves played an important role in shaping views on them that "Jews are just like everyone, but just a little bit more"<sup>67</sup>. As Arendt reminded that they were often called *a national minority par excellence*, analogically, they were, in the highest degree and incarnation, citizens of the states, in which they had lived for centuries. This created double standards describing the perpetrators and victims, because shaped characteristics of the European nations, then captured by the Jews, constituted an obstacle to the absolute condemnation of the state, which for many victims was the only known homeland. Unfortunately, the Jews actually until the outbreak of World War II did not receive a specific opportunity for assimilation in the old countries<sup>68</sup>. For the cognitive purposes it would be worthwhile to trace the emergence of various institutional positions in European politics since the end of the nineteenth century, in which they adjudicated rations increasingly detrimental to the interests of the European Jewish Diaspora. The history of the Jewish people is marked by processes that implemented the necessary political interest precisely at the moment when the others passed on to the next stage of development of political subjectivity. Jews were so, not necessarily because of their own fault, institutionally late by an average of half a century. However individually they were extraordinarily modern. They did not have time to assimilate when strong nation states were growing in importance. Young democracies were collapsing before the war. When they received their own state as a compensation for historical wrongs, the ability to defend and promote national characteristics, others began to move away from the typical national borders. It was not only in the positive sense of countries opening up for integration, but also as a materialization of the concept of a global caliphate, where the neighbors of Israel united as its religious enemies. At the same time, it was suggested that nationalisms emerged from the political catalogue, so others began to judge the Jews this time for possession of the state<sup>69</sup>. Mark Lilla states

<sup>66</sup> P. Stefaniuk, *Teoria polityki...*, p. 312.

<sup>67</sup> K. Kłopotowski, *op. cit.*, passim.; A. Dulas, *W naszych rodzinach jest strach: z Anną Niewiadomską-Milczarek o jej żydowskich korzeniach i życiu w Łodzi rozmawia Aleksandra Dulas*, <http://lodzkagazeta.pl/w-naszach-rodzinach-jest-strach/>, access on 03.02.2016.

<sup>68</sup> Cf: D. Gawin, *Leo Strauss – antyczny filozof i żydowski mędrzec*, „Teologia Polityczna”, *Rocznik filozoficzny* nr 4/autumn 2006 – summer 2007, p. 59.

<sup>69</sup> Cf: *ibidem*.

that “[...] Israel is the nation-state, nation-state of the Jews, and draws pride from this. It is profoundly embarrassing to post-national Europe”<sup>70</sup>. Understanding of these rules is associated with the pressure to replace the paradigm, created before World War II, which sanctioned the right for nation-states to defend their own resources, with the conventions of modern supranational integration. Kuhnian’s scientific crisis meant the state in which the former defenders of the old scientific tradition (Israel – the State to protect the interests of the Jewish people) are forced to defend their paradigm, making ad hoc modifications, such as to eliminate emerging contradictions<sup>71</sup>. Yoram Hazony described it, recalling that the Jews relying on the Anglo-Saxon countries-protectors could not rescue their wives and children, because there was a Nazi bureaucracy, which was aimed at total annihilation of the Jewish people, when at the same time there was not a parallel bureaucratic mechanism of defense, as today is the state Israel<sup>72</sup>. He reminds us that modern Israel is the state of the Jewish people, not the Israelis, indivisible good, which is the only means of securing the fate of the Jews, because no international agreement guaranteed it before World War II<sup>73</sup>. It is interesting, however, that the new paradigm requires to see the *Shoah* only as an effect arising from the consolidation of the German national values, thereby rejecting the search for the causes of life in the Diaspora and not possessing the state by Jews immediately before the era of Hitler. As a result of the new research tradition, and implicitly political, Israel can not be a nation-state of the Jews, because this kind of subjectivity is considered a universal source of evil. As a result, the argument about the need for the rights to defense has been revoked. Such a conventional need for equality of all nationalisms requires seeing them as a destructive element for the international order. The mistake of this thinking is a renunciation of the right to defense by the Jews as well as the others. Science in its essence seeks to obtain objective truths; however, paradigms in the social sciences are, after all, except strictly cognitive function, the result of political interests and ideologies which are the representation of the typical ideological division represented outside the direct research activities. The scientific revolution according to Kuhn began at a time when in some societies a growing belief that the institutions no longer would solve the problems for which they were established. On the basis, a new supranational paradigm redefined the essence of the division into nation-states, which were the cause of creating a threat to global society. In this context, the least important are the facts at such

<sup>70</sup> M. Lilla, *Koniec polityki*, „Teologia Polityczna”, *Rocznik filozoficzny* nr 4/jesień 2006 – lato 2007, p. 65.

<sup>71</sup> T. S. Kuhn, *Struktura rewolucji...*, pp. 142-143.

<sup>72</sup> See: Y. Hazony, *Israel Through European Eyes*, „Jerusalem Letters” 14 July 2010, <http://via.readerimpact.com/v/1/792bc4b1ec4cad1e102bfb9bbcc0325c6b7210346658c26c>, access on 08.02.2016.

<sup>73</sup> See: *ibidem*.

a moment, because each time the image of the history will help find any justification. State as a political entity is a direct danger for the people who attempt to remove its constitutive feature (politicization) from their world. Political order simply depends on the dominant axiology, usually also has a high capacity for replication. The old ideologies, which compromised themselves by the acts of people trying to realize them, changed their *dossier* by going into a format of a phase conditioned by political post-modernism. Commitment to the ideals let the people of the Left find a new ideology of political correctness. However, too radical conscription of ideals of *political correctness* results in the fact that in the weight of criticism there is everything that does not fit into already settled code. The political goals of the Jews were protected in the consequence of the experience of the Holocaust and the sensitivity to anti-Semitism. However, what seemed indisputable does not necessarily refer to the state of Israel. This applies especially to the political program of Zionism: “[...] the major importance, which today is given to the definition of Zionism, implies recognition of the State of Israel as the state of the Jews all over the world, and not only citizens living in it”<sup>74</sup>. The term *national minority par excellence* was invented for the purpose of rehabilitation of the countries that were not able to prevent the destruction of one nation. However, Israel as a subject of international order is a major political challenge for centers aiming to weaken the influence of a national state-creating factor. Therefore, history of the Jews is evaluated otherwise, and in a very different way their policy towards Palestinians, where many do not hesitate to recognize the Israeli actions as a sign of aggression. Defense of the rights of religious or ethnic minorities, even if they are not literally arithmetic minority comes down to a criticism of the stronger, in this case Israel, without having to verify the relevant reasons and facts made by this oppressed group.

Parallelism of political fate can be derived from the analysis by Paweł Śpiewak who describes *the Jewish communism (Żydokomuna)* as a political phenomenon. The order of communists fits in the dual picture of the world. So it was the political opposition of a literal or alleged manifestation of attack on a national tissue made by the national or religious minorities, or ideologies, which was perceived in the Second Republic as a necessity of immediate political association, through the antithesis to the enemies of their own order<sup>75</sup>. The economic situation of the Jews in Poland at that time was difficult, but the possibility of the development of Jewish culture and the profession of religion in principle unlimited<sup>76</sup>. Similarly happens with the state of Israel, since the characteristics for the development of minorities living abroad, are not compatible

<sup>74</sup> Sh. Sand, *op. cit.*, p. 30.

<sup>75</sup> Cf. C. Schmitt, *Pojęcie polityczności*, [in:] *idem, Teologia polityczna i inne pisma*, Kraków 2000, pp. 198-199.

<sup>76</sup> P. Śpiewak, *op. cit.*, p. 138.

with the policy of protecting the biological existence of their own people in its domain. Therefore, Israel is a contrast to the modern postnational political order. Śpiewak wrote: “whether Bolshevik Jews supported or opposed someone, not national origin, but party policy decided. In this sense, the Jewish Bolsheviks were mainly Bolsheviks, Communists”<sup>77</sup>. The problem of the Jewish communism is a mirror of today’s ideology of political correctness. Opinions about Jewish communists are exposed through the anti-Semitic filter, and not the fact that they were mainly Communists, and in the same way the group of The First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party Władysław Gomułka, who implemented and quickly stifled “anti-Zionist” way to distinguish individual party activists from each other. From the perspective of the Polish nation communism was condemned primarily, because such a feeling was common. Moreover, an increase in anti-Semitism was the result of hostility towards the Soviet aggressor, with which Jews were often identified. Polish nationalism, beyond the circles of the Communist Party, in practice, could have been primarily a defensive posture (counterfactual hypothesis), although this type of thinking is rejected by professor Śpiewak<sup>78</sup>. In many ways the Polish anti-communist disgust or experience of *the Shoah* in a similar manner controlled the way of thinking, under which people formed extreme charges to each other. I do not undertake to assess their relevance and value; I say only that the shaped system of conclusions does not allow any expression of empathy, and in the strictly scientific sense, to go beyond the paradigm. If in the science, permanent types, interpretation clichés are valid, then every judgment is involved in this. It is therefore difficult to investigate the facts without interpreting them permanently. Strictly documented political history can not be free from the interpretation that others call political worldview. Ignoring this fact, we are heading in the direction of departure from theory towards the doctrinaire, cognitive dogma, and its effectiveness is measured only with loudness of arguments. It is impossible, however, to move away from theory-laden observation, because this and the interpretation of phenomena are involved in the causes, to which we give priority in the spirit of espoused theories. The imputations against the citizens of Israel today, after changing the existing paradigm,

<sup>77</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 100; por. *ibidem*, pp. 177-178.

<sup>78</sup> Cf. *ibidem*, pp. 195-196, 198. It is difficult to identify a common denominator of acts of Polish Jews by the independence groups before and shortly after World War II. From the perspective of political science, it is important whether the work of documenting cases of killings of Jewish survivors by the troops of the National Armed Forces (NSZ) are more precise in the sense of the real understanding if the message will be limited to the fact that a certain number of people were killed. I do not mean questioning that fact, but only an attempt to examine whether anti-Semitism was the only and necessary condition, because, in fact, we limit ourselves to this explanation, when arrangements are reduced to identify the nationalities of the victims themselves. Moreover, showing that “Poles murdered **Jews**” in the sense of pure research closes the discussion even only on the scale of anti-Semitism, gives it the highest priority.

apply only to the fact that in the new circumstances they were acknowledged, ironically, as nationalists *par excellence*. This type of accusations is cumbersome for both the accused as well as the formulating such opinions people.

That dominance of *fundamental scientific paradigms*, as Shlomo Sand described in his book, allows us to understand the complexity of the methodological historiography of the Jewish people, expressed in a high degree of subsumption under the canons of cognition, which should not be confused with the simplicity of the solutions<sup>79</sup>. In this perspective, one can recognize a new cause of such a late publication of *the Holocaust of European Jews*. It was not treated with due attention, because it did not apply to the pattern of the Jewish historiography. It was not in any way offensive, basically did not raise any source doubts. The problem was, however, something different, because while Hilberg made an indescribable effort in reaching the sources, however, not to those whose power explanation was considered valid. The problem of general historiography is a matter of a different interpretation of historical sources, and the puritanical approach in general rejects any need to interpret them, assuming that they themselves provide objective knowledge of the facts. They forget, however, the fact that getting to the documents generates the need to understand them what is of paramount importance for the whole world of political science.

The liberal political gene of Jewish people gave every its representative the opportunity to obtain conventional economic, educational or cultural superiority in societies, which then they co-created. Unfortunately for them, politics is shaped by the collective organisms, gaining strength as a result of group behavior and effectively promoting the dual division of the world. A Jew does not fit this with his individualistic approach to manage their own biography. In this way, the assertion that ‘the Jews ruled the world’ should be perceive at the level of assessment of political discourse a little differently. There is probably a group of people taking care of the rights to manage the narration by the Jews, without a doubt, a nation having a significant impact on the development of the world, mainly through the financial influence and scientific achievements. However, seeing policy on the macro scale, in a cratocentric way as conventional tender between the subjects of decision, by the twentieth century until the present to us today, one can hypothesize that the state of Israel and the Jewish people *en bloc* are not the main political meta-player, but rather the object of external actions of politicians-demiurges. The fact that the political interests of Israel and American Jews are properly secured, perhaps equally depends on themselves, and those who accept this state. Of course, in terms of the beyond conventional policy, so even managing imagination, based on instruments that were built by the Jewish creative genius. None of the presidents of the

---

<sup>79</sup> Cf. Sh. Sand, *op. cit.*, p. 127-128.



United States has been a Jew or a woman, and the 44th US President Barack Obama, finalized and discounted affirmative chapter in American politics. It remains an open question whether the assessment of the political advantages of any nation needs a literal realization in the form of its institutional supremacy.

### Contre-Cliché

„Undoubtedly, personal experience can sway a historian’s choice of research topic, probably more so than for a mathematician or a physicist. But it would be wrong to assume that personal experience dominates the process and method of the historian’s work. Sometimes a generous grant directs a researcher to a particular field. At other times, if less often, findings rise up and compel a scholar to take a new direction.”<sup>80</sup>.

These words of professor of history at the University of Tel Aviv are an introduction to the analysis of the problems raised in the publications about the Jews, which aspire to move away from the epistemological stereotype. This is not always possible, or the author does not see that he has stuck in the paradigm, although he tried to criticize it. The world of science often faces with situations in which the presented positions, aspiring to be recognized for scientific bring the authors allegations of adventurism, radical views or revisionism. You can risk the hypothesis that historiography affecting the fate of the Jewish people is subject to specific intersubjective quantifications. The most common and probably the most effective weapon in the fight against unpopular books is to identify the authors that they present their own worldview, which is to lower the status of the scientific studies submitted by them.

The basic reference will be the rule of thinking determined in French: cliché (platitude, stereotype thinking). Dariusz Libionka performed this type of analysis, describing the declarative language of a Polish Catholic journal, published shortly before World War II<sup>81</sup>. The author based his research on repeating category of “the Jewish question”, which they tried to settle in National Democracy and Catholic environments in the Second Republic. A kind of paradox, however, is the situation in which thinking in terms of the clichés becomes a characteristic of almost all socio-humanistic researchers. The reasons for this are twofold. The first one internal is the above-mentioned inability to free themselves from the influence of theories that shape our judgment of the world. Each research result is accompanied after all by a subjective need to make them intersubjectively accepted, and thus convincing the environment to the scientific reason, when the pursuit of truth is objectively an unattainable goal. The second

<sup>80</sup> Sh. Sand, *The Invention of the Jewish People*, London – New York 2009, p. 14.

<sup>81</sup> D. Libionka, „Kwestia żydowska” – myślenie za pomocą clichés. „Odrodzenie” 1935-1939. *Przyczynek do historii antysemityzmu w Polsce*, „Dzieje Najnowsze”, Yearbook XXVII, 1995 No. 3, pp. 31-46.

reason, external: scientists examining social and political reality can not within the discretion of the condition *ceteris paribus* indicate a simplified duality between the ability to describe reality, which is not yet static, without taking into account the statistical measurement error. Thus, each individual case, which is not located in the paradigm of anti-Semitism, is considered in advance as an insignificant deviation, as the circumstances previously not included<sup>82</sup>. Then complex motivations become significant which *en bloc* were treated as a manifestation of racial hatred, becoming a methodological regression. If, in fact, it was so in relation to the subject of social research, then we would be forced to assume that the only thing we can do is to define the taxonomy types. In the case of *cliché*, we do not have to deal with the idealization, but the condition of *ceteris paribus*. It should be emphasized that this is not only the methodological, but also the ideological choice, corresponding with the theory-laden observation. The difference, as Adam Grobler emphasizes, is blurred or pragmatic<sup>83</sup>. Let us quote from the text by Libionka:

“Cliches are part of the ideological language. Using the category of <<the Jewish question>> allowed giving the impression that the association [“ODRODZENIE” – ed. LM] conducts political activities in the interest of the <<nation >>. The methodological difficulty that an anti-Semite wants to overcome is the fact of differentiation of <<the Jews>>. Separation of the group which is the subject of <<the Jewish case>> may, but need not be done by using the criterion of race. [...] In the Catholic Church there was no place for racial criterion, but despite many attempts Catholic press failed to resolve the difficulties, what is and what is not <<racist>>. That was probably the reason they tried to avoid defining <<Jewishness>>. Always they treated Jews as a group, using the cliché: Jew will always be a Jew, will never be a Pole [...]”<sup>84</sup>.

It is worth noting that Christians (approx. 90%) dominated the religious structure in the Second Republic, however, from today’s common perspective “only” about 77 percent (including 12 percent of Greek Catholics) declared the Roman Catholics faith. At the same time nearly 10 percent of the population admitted to Judaism. With this simplified statistics of other Polish Christians 87 percent of the citizens (77% of Catholics and 10% of Jews) should therefore be excluded from the group. So if you apply a closed set: “The Catholic Church”, then you can easily come to the logical syllogism, “every Catholic in Poland is a Pole, and every Catholic is an anti-Semite, ergo every Pole is an anti-Semite.” We can find that this is not, of course, for libel, but the logical conclusion of indirectly cited statistics. If we then get at least 4/5 of anti-Semites in Poland, and we assume at least a neutral attitude of other Christians towards the Jews (*ceteris paribus*), as the result of such a cliché, we get a conclusion that anti-Semitism was

<sup>82</sup> Cf. A. Grobler, *op. cit.*, p. 128.

<sup>83</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 172.

<sup>84</sup> D. Libionka, *op. cit.*, p. 39.

a dominant position in the social relations of the Second Republic, mainly through national identity absolutizing all the people and supported by Catholicism the. The basis for this analysis is not to question the findings of historians, because anti-Semitism of the contemporary Poles is treated in the study as a fact, and so as an undisputed matter. However, the question in this case is the value of the phenomenon, its manifestations, but this does not prove its versatility, and even more universality. The issue of recognition of racial, ethnic and religious factors must in fact raise doubts, especially because as rightly observed by Dariusz Libionka, the Catholic Church could not sublimate these categories on the basis of the rejection of the obvious racial prejudice. This becomes even more inaccurate when such conclusions are almost mechanically transferred to the communist period and the Third Republic. Meanwhile, the cliché also used by Libionka, creating a universal set of animosity towards Jews, closes all in one cause, the racial hatred. He sees in the category of analysis the cliché of “the Jewish question” called by him “a pattern – gaining unlimited power over human thinking”<sup>85</sup>. We should fully agree with the author. The scientific value of this argument, however, is universal, so the analogy is applicable to “anti-Semitism”. Moreover, the conclusion about the desire to exclude Jews from the Polish community at the same time excludes the argument about their dislike for such identification. In essence, therefore, it is the defense of the paradigm, which allows you to reconstruct any study of the phenomenon, which received the nature of a scientific law. It seems that in the epistemological terms we can not put serious reservations. However, in the case of the cited code, we deal with the apparent and postulatory scientific law. Of course, there are social laws, and in the case of anti-Semitism, we can even talk about some kind of its durability and repeatability<sup>86</sup>. However, following this path will lead us to extraordinary deductive conclusion that with the growth of national consciousness everywhere outside of Israel anti-Semitism is growing. To be precise Libionka closes his consideration in the caesura of time 1935-1939, but the choice of analysis tools (cliché) is not yet limited in terms of historical generalization. We can get the impression, because the phenomenon, which could not be fully realized by researchers, exceeded the level of the historical generalization, aspiring to become a theoretical law. Generalizations are an effective tool for the construction and subsequent verification of hypotheses. The study of history has become in itself the object of knowledge, while at the same time the basis for social theories<sup>87</sup>. Moreover, anti-Semitism is in the category of psychological theories a momentous allegation, and using the language of the proceedings – at least a serious offense. We should take into account these circumstances, because they give a higher

<sup>85</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 33. (Quotation – footnote 14).

<sup>86</sup> Cf. A. Grobler, *op. cit.*, p. 230.

<sup>87</sup> Cf. A. Sułek, *Eksperyment w badaniach społecznych*, Warszawa 1979, pp. 190-191.

priority to the cognitive researches of social and political behavior. Then the discussion of the results of such research becomes embroiled in a paradigm from which you can not liberate with a simple declaration<sup>88</sup>.

Each objection to the cliché as a consequence of itself becomes at least partially a *cliché*. It should be clearly noted that these doubts arise because of comparing methodology of historical and political science research. Documenting here and reporting on the fact by a historian confronts with social consciousness of a political scientist who analyzes these undisputed facts in the dynamic relationship of the researcher and the object under test in a changing world, where a permanent process of self-referentiality lasts. However, the historian is not free from it as well, and the ideal of objective, non-valuating scientist is an unfulfilled ambition of the environment of social scientists. In this respect, we have to deal with the phenomenon of coincidence of explanations<sup>89</sup>. It follows from this that the tests taken from different angles do not intersect each other at any point relevant for the result. They coexist, providing formatted and varied knowledge, but still are not a mutual falsification. They are conditioned on commitment to paradigms, and from its features a reference to the tradition becomes the main criterion.

### Anti-Semitism in terms of meta-theory

The world of scientific research can not mean the dummy relationship, unless we reduce the social reactions to the simplified liking or antipathy. It is therefore primarily on the fact that in a continuum of anti-Semitism – philo-Semitism the essence of explanations of many past and present relationships of Jews and Gentiles is included. It is worth noting that even philo-Semitism meets with limited confidence on the part of Jewish scholars. Even Hannah Arendt gave an expression of this, referring to the psychological analysis. She showed that the admiration of educated people or gestures of friendship towards the Jews did not prevent them later from running the factories of death<sup>90</sup>. This is not a simple two-element reality. Especially, in the case of social studies the questionable classification is resolving and reducing for getting to know public sentiments, without the answer to the question: why love and hate for the Jews come from

<sup>88</sup> Cognitive status of anti-Semitism should be unconfounded to use it as a tool of reviews of methodologically different, not **ideologically**, texts. The accusation of anti-Semitism itself among scientists is an unscientific value judgment, of course, **except the cases** where the reconstructions of certain social behaviors are carried out. In this sense, value judgments, however, are a component of scientific practice, through its non-scientific impact on the shaped and approved scientific ethos. Cf: S. Amsterdamski, *Tertium non datur? Szkice i polemiki*, Warszawa 1994, p. 131.

<sup>89</sup> Cf: Ł. Młyńczyk, *Koincydencja jako alternatywa dla „krytycznego racjonalizmu Poppera”*, „Athenaeum. Polskie Studia Politologiczne”, No. 26/2010, pp. 22-31.

<sup>90</sup> H. Arendt, *Korzenie totalitaryzmu...*, p. 137.

the same set of social feelings. You can even present the facts, where behaviors aimed at manifesting support for the Jews were a reaction to the growing anti-Semitism, adding the latter elements of fanaticism<sup>91</sup>. Although established stereotypes: good Jew – bad Gentile or a bad Jew – good Gentile, appeal to the individual psychological structure of each researcher involved, it is worth considering how it can remain unconfounded in permanent judgment, controlling his or her cognitive skills. However, it should be emphasized that the motives of this type can be of very individual character (feelings, experiences) that can pass (but does not have to) in the collective context (political) and / or finds its apogee in scientific identification, whereby this last can be woven into the first two categories. Each declarative statement of an entity is embroiled in verbal and non-verbal empirical associations, which inherits them<sup>92</sup>. Conscious or aimless expansion into the paradigm always creates a certain research opposition. Primary nature of such statements reveals the proper context of scientific understanding (*Verstehen*) as an imitative experience. Jan Tomasz Gross aptly claimed that stereotypes are not subject to falsification with the facts, and therefore it is difficult to argue with them<sup>93</sup>. Anti-Semitism must be seen through the prism of average skills and theoretical shortcomings of all the social sciences, so using it as a scientific formula may have the features of epiphenomenon. We will measure the value of such a paradigm by its significance, representativeness and effectiveness of research, as in the case of political science can always be included in the current political context. The latter is still supplied with information being given on the level of colloquial judgments.

Using the category of anti-Semitism as a research strategy is a full-fledged tool for understanding, so in the methodological sense, there is no question of any error. Doubts relate to the fact that it acquired the status of a theoretical law by its common understanding. It became the basis of descriptions, as if denying or simplifying an explanation. From the point of view of the analysis of political science, it is also important to refer to this phenomenon, through not only its identification, but also above all the cause and distribution. This flows directly from preferred by me the epistemological orientation, so the strategy of understanding naturalism. This is the essence of analysis based on explanation of naturalistic causality of phenomena (functional processes) and intentionality, which means understanding the motives of actions<sup>94</sup>. Nevertheless, I would like to take an attempt of metatheoretical reconstruction of anti-Semitism as a postulatory law of science that would express the statement: Jewish minority within any country meets with acts of aggression and hostility. Hannah Arendt shows an

<sup>91</sup> Cf. *ibidem*, p. 138.

<sup>92</sup> Cf. J. Kmita, *Wymykanie się uniwersaliom*, Warszawa 2000, pp. 33-34.

<sup>93</sup> J. T. Gross, *Strach: Antysemityzm w Polsce tuż po wojnie. Historia moralnej zapaści*, Kraków 2008, p. 9.

<sup>94</sup> Cf. J. Topolski, *op. cit.*, p. 190.

interesting case: “Anti-Semitism became effective politically only when it had grown from telling horror stories and became a theory that could be combined with modern, in fact, always burning issues, and used to support certain tendencies within the political struggle, originally having little in common with the Jews”<sup>95</sup>. In the functional part, we can mark the essence of the biological processes of adaptation, which the anti-Semitism includes. In this sense, it refers to a primitive fear and superstitions<sup>96</sup>. Of these two elements, it is the fear that has an adaptive function. In turn, the stereotype is already a fragment of intentional understanding of the world. It is clear that you can point to the simultaneous occurrence of two forms of scientific explanation: functional and intentional. For now, they still exist independently without becoming integral components of explanation. The characteristics of social cognitive process on the regulation of individual reactions are the arguments in favor of the recognition of the theory of anti-Semitism. Therefore, cognition is to remember the individual situation in order to use the stored messages about it, where the cause and the components of behavior (actions) perpetuate. In simple terms, the point is to recreate conditions and actions that under certain conditions proved to be effective, because they served to achieve an identified target. The second set consists of elements contained in the reactions of the central nervous system, reducing the sensation of pain or the body’s self-defense<sup>97</sup>. Both mechanisms of regulations of social behavior tend toward traceable intentions. Walentina Leonowicz’s position is expressed by emphasizing the role of emotional self-control which is a more important cause of creation of human society than cognition abilities<sup>98</sup>. And this brings us to the anti-naturalistic claims that people do not act in accordance with the laws, but because of their understanding<sup>99</sup>, and thus empathizing with the intention of the people living before us is the essence of understanding culture, in turn, predicting future behaviors based on laws is the domain of naturalists<sup>100</sup>. This has particular implications for the understanding of anti-Semitism in the form of scientific method. Following Weber’s recognition of intentional sense of causative subject’s actions<sup>101</sup>, it will be possible to place the following hypothesis: universality, durability and repeatability of the phenomena of anti-Semitism in the Second Republic of Poland and the Polish People’s Republic, recognized in their own lived cultural pattern,

<sup>95</sup> H. Arendt, *Antysemityzm*, [in:] *Eadem, Pisma żydowskie...*, p. 81.

<sup>96</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 80.

<sup>97</sup> *O prymacie etyki: rozmowa z Walentyną Leonowicz*, [in:] W. Osiatyński, *Zrozumieć świat: rozmowy z uczonymi 25 lat później*, Warszawa 2009, p. 91.

<sup>98</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 92.

<sup>99</sup> Cf: Ł. Młyńczyk, *Między kreatywnością a próżnowaniem. Polityczność dwóch typów idealnych*, Warszawa 2015, pp. 183-184.

<sup>100</sup> Cf: A. Grobler, *op. cit.*, p. 229-230.

<sup>101</sup> Cf: M. Weber, *Gospodarka i społeczeństwo: zarys socjologii rozumiejącej*, Warszawa 2002, p. 6.

makes them a non-universal social law, and as such evidence it can be used to describe social relations in spatial and temporal terms. The intention of such studies will not be falsification of law, but strengthening it by further unit confirmation (indication of facts). In this place, the directive of integral explanation is fulfilled.

### **Do history, sociology and political science create ethnonationalistic paradigms?**

I will try to verify studies polemic against each other for somehow ethnonationalistic paradigms. For specific examples, you can try to illustrate the variety of potential error in cognitive considerations made by Jan Tomasz Gross<sup>102</sup> and Marek Jan Chodakiewicz<sup>103</sup>. Again, it is not a question of factography, which for political scientists is the starting point, and not a condition for polemics. Moreover it should be strongly emphasized that presented in both books exemplification does not create any field to challenge the findings of both authors. Nevertheless, the assessments of political scientists are associated with the adoption of cognitive perspective of historians and sociologists who use the paradigms involved in the conventional political dispute. Collective memory and historical policy serve contemporarily the features of public policies, and as such are studied by political science involving the essence of its problem of knowledge, so the politicization (“this the Political”<sup>104</sup>). Immediately the question arises whether the reconciliation of opposing positions will be more than just a dialectical unity of opposites. Paweł Śpiewak calls Chodakiewicz’s works “nationalist history”<sup>105</sup>. On the other hand, comparing both authors with each other Jan Żaryn criticizes Gross for reduction of the phenomenon of anti-Semitism, escaping from the context and the accusation of fundamental values and institutions of the Catholic Church<sup>106</sup>. I am not referring to these allegations, because the choice of examples in the text was motivated by the significant occurrence of the authors and their research in public space and debate<sup>107</sup>, where a number of activities are analyzed in a political context. Moreover,

<sup>102</sup> Cf: J. T. Gross, *op. cit.*

<sup>103</sup> See: M. J. Chodakiewicz, *Po Zagładzie: stosunki polsko-żydowskie 1944-1947*, Warszawa 2008.

<sup>104</sup> See: R. Skarżyński, *Od chaosu do ładu: Carl Schmitt i problem tego, co polityczne*, Warszawa 2012.

<sup>105</sup> See: P. Śpiewak, *op. cit.*, p. 214.

<sup>106</sup> Cf: J. Żaryn, *Pogarda dla kontekstu* („Rzeczpospolita”, 19-20 January 2008), [in:] *Wokół Strachu: dyskusja o książce Jana T. Grossa*, (choice and layout of the texts by M. Gądek), Kraków 2008, pp. 112-117.

<sup>107</sup> It will be supplemented by the information that the book by M. J. Chodakiewicz, which is the translation of his English-language PhD obtained at Columbia University in New York, was released in Poland by the Institute of National Remembrance with an introduction by Prof. Wojciech Roszkowski.

Chodakiewicz defended his own conclusions just with an original methodology, while blaming the work by J. T. Gross for inaccuracies in this field<sup>108</sup>. Another reason is the fact that the article does not refer directly to the category of ideologization of science but examines phenomena in theory-political terms.

Let me quote an example of methodological strategy, cited by the author of *Strach (Fear)*. Citing incomplete, as he notes, the findings of other authors he stipulates that “[...] despite all we get a basis for generalizing reflection, because for the study of this phenomenon [the crimes committed against the Jews by Poles in the Kielce region – ed. Ł.M.] scientists used the entire body of empirical data from a very important source [distinction – J.T.G.]”<sup>109</sup>. For the latter they gathered all court records in the processes for the crimes done to the Jews in the area, as well as direct talks of the authors with the inhabitants of the then Kielce region, which enabled in such a way to construct a narrative and conclusions<sup>110</sup>. The important information is also the statement placed by Gross in the *Introduction* that the book is the result of an external stimulus (reading another book)<sup>111</sup>. You can see that he makes evaluation by an established opinion, based on the standard of validating the source. Of course, it is not about questioning that choice and inner conviction. Gross’s strong imperative to build generalizing reflection is far more interesting. We are back in this way to the category of personal experience of the researcher, raised earlier by Shlomo Sand. Summing up together these two categories, at the same time we can point at relying on anti-Semitism as a general law, although in the case of Jan Tomasz Gross it will be reasonable to talk about the use of idiographic-induction explanation. So expressed claim to generality results from the strong conviction that the next undisputed facts constitute empirical interpretation and consolidation of anti-Semitism as a reliable explanation of the social process. Another concretization serves as a higher probability of generalization, becoming regularity. Individual experience, or its partial succession, informs us of the truth of our own beliefs and perceptions. In contrast, in the purely scientific sense it does not guarantee the truth of judgments about the world outside. Stefan Nowak noted that in the case of cognitive stimuli we do not control the situation in which we select the phenomenon to the most important aspect, so that in a dark room we refer to the

---

The book by Jan Tomasz Gross, a professor at Princeton University, a former lecturer at Yale University, a man repressed after the *March events*, is an historical-sociological essay, containing important judgment of experiences of relations of the Jewish and Polish nations, his personal translation from the original issued in English, and issued in Poland by the Publishing House “Znak”.

<sup>108</sup> Statement by Mark J. Chodakiewicz in Jan Pospieszalski’s program „Warto rozmawiać” (TVP on 14.01.2008), <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iwl6S-D1t50>; access on 21.02.2016.

<sup>109</sup> J. T. Gross, *op. cit.*, p. 35.

<sup>110</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>111</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 10.



absence of light and not to other indicators that might describe this<sup>112</sup>. Therefore, the fact of generalizing comment of the author of *Strach* can not be surprising: “[...] because of the terror mechanisms of <<the final solution>> and universality of contacts between the Polish and Jewish population we can advance a thesis that the fate of Jewish fellow citizens lies in the center of the occupation experience of the Polish residents of each village or town where Jews lived before the war”<sup>113</sup>. So formulated thesis is taken as evidence *ipso facto*. The law of science needs to recognize more than confirmation of the hypothesis, which showed the relationship between the phenomena: *where Jews lived in Poland, the experience of the war established and widely adopted or activated anti-Semitism*. Thus, the scope of the research sample, which is a finite set of Polish population, needs a general theorem, exceeding the value and volume of the sample. Otherwise, you would need to reduce to the notion of “Polish anti-Semitism”, showing its specificity and distinctness (Polish character) in a hostile attitude towards Jews (anti-Semitism). Then it would be a historical generalization, to confirm which we could use incomplete induction<sup>114</sup>. “Going beyond the boundaries of the tested population, we always assume a certain – defined or undefined – risk of error associated with such a generalization”<sup>115</sup>. If we prioritize Catholicism as an indicator of Polishness, according to the assumptions of Jan T. Gross, recognizing it as a constitutive feature, it is easy to point to Judaism as an antinomy of Catholicism, and so Polishness<sup>116</sup>. Sacralization of anti-Semitism, however, is a variant of the cognitive risk, because it assumes that the historical state-building idea, and therefore the dominant religion, is associated with an open racist attitude, and not the opposition to any other religion – anti-Judaism. In this case, generalization could only be based on an independent study of various loyalties of Polish citizens: religious, state or cultural. The reverse implication gives us the following logically incorrect result: every Pole is a Catholic, so that every Catholic is a Pole. However, moving to the theorem “every Pole is a Catholic” we generalize another historical fact – “every Catholic is an anti-Semite”, so according to the rules of the syllogism one states: “every Pole is an anti-Semite”. Even if we reject a literal interpretation of the arithmetic resources of Catholicism in Poland, we should reflect on the error of attribution. Recognizing Catholicism as a feature of Polishness, we almost completely reduce the external factors of human behavior, locking them in permanent causes of traits – faith implies anti-Semitism. The religiosity of Poles is not yet a twentieth-century phenomenon, and shared mutual fates of Jews and Poles date back, depending on the methodology, for eight to ten centuries, therefore, reminding that this

<sup>112</sup> S. Nowak, *Metodologia badań społecznych*, Warszawa 2010, p. 278.

<sup>113</sup> J. T. Gross, *op. cit.*, p. 44.

<sup>114</sup> S. Nowak, *op. cit.*, p. 297.

<sup>115</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>116</sup> J. T. Gross, *op. cit.*, p. 312.

is not the Poles who built the concentration camps with gas chambers is not worthy of serious scientific debate. These methodological doubts are the result of researching sources in spatiotemporal terms, when we authoritatively assume that “[...] a studied community is representative of the entire population, to which the generalization is referring”<sup>117</sup>. Representativeness of Catholicism in Polish public awareness encourages to generalizations, an allegedly homogeneous society would present homogeneous attitudes. So do the Poles (original identity) are / were anti-Semites, or they become them as Catholics (secondary identification)? One can see that the validity of this reasoning is valid only in one direction, because when we take into account the fact of being an anti-Semite *par excellence*, we can not reliably indicate whether this happens by individual characteristics, or only through the ethnic and / or religious filter.

Judaization, nationalization or sacralization of the function of evil fit in the ordinary meaning of the paradigm of anti-Semitism. The authority of the investigator is decisive in this case. However, we can hardly recognize such a classification as exclusively scientific, because the authority decrees it also on the level of the language characterized politically, therefore, a community gathered around these words harnesses paradigm in the content of ideological dispute. Using the universal research key is also a temptation to a demonstrable provoking intersubjectivity. Social scientists create conglomerates, increasingly representing outside schools and theoretical approaches, identifiable postulative judgments about reality. This often has the form of self-fulfilling prophecy. All of this is included in the intentionality of knowledge, as a specific behavior of researchers who want to achieve the goal in the proper form, also in accordance with their conscience, of the analysis of social phenomena. So that the testability measure will be achieved *a priori*, while the effectiveness of repression of polemical findings proves to be a more important clause.

Research presented by Marek Jan Chodakiewicz in his book *After the Holocaust – Polish-Jewish Conflict in the Wake of World War II* should be evaluated primarily in terms of cognitive biases of the social sciences. Despite maintaining standards of historiography, the analysis derived from these sources is actually faulty, because although the author declared the adoption of interesting initial indicators<sup>118</sup>, in the narrative he tries to fit in too rigid framework of the constantly narrowed problem. Confirmation bias refers to the selective treatment of opinions, in order to select those that confirm the initial assumptions. Emotional approach to research results is a consequence of the conventional superiority paradigm of anti-Semitism, which it is difficult to face in the category of importance of the impact. Probably scientists then look for hard empirical data, which could indisputably illustrate adopted assertions in the author’s

<sup>117</sup> S. Nowak, *op. cit.*, p. 298.

<sup>118</sup> Cf. M. J. Chodakiewicz, *op. cit.*, pp. 11-12.

mind. Referring to the phenomenon of researcher's identification with the studied phenomenon you can diagnose an observable cognitive obsession. Representatives of the paradigm may ignore evidence that might deny their assumptions. This happens intentionally, as an expression of the national identification of the researcher or sub-consciously by looking in places where there will be no doubt. The post-war Polish-Jewish relations are mutually interpreted statistically; however, figures do not so much represent the essence of empirical evidence, as they are interpretation of a judgment about reality. In other words, they do not represent a universal acknowledgment, but a kind of deliberate denial of the opposite assertion. An important way of managing research workshop seems to be mainly calling into question the figures that have not been confirmed by existing sources<sup>119</sup>. Ethno-nationalistic paradigm, recognized formally, will be part of policy-making in the historical meaning of public policy, which is characteristic for part of the scientific elites in both Israel and Poland. The number of six million Jewish victims of the Second World War is now no longer just a numerical measure of the sufferings of one nation, but a symbolic evidence of extreme nihilism of the Third Reich, well-established in the collective consciousness so much that any attempt to make a more accurate measure would be doomed to political ostracism. The latter became a part of scientific knowledge, which even if it gave rise to doubt, closes the discussion by the threat of formulating criminal charge (*Holocaust Denial*). Enlarging the impact of this state of affairs also affects the scale of anti-Semitic incidents in Poland just after the war. The memory stores not only real facts, but also no less important theorems and their ideas. In this way, the attitudes of Poles towards Jews are judged by an unwanted presence and actions of the Nazis on Polish soil. A specific collective *halo effect* appeared, often reducing almost ten centuries of common history of both nations to killings and persecution, and denunciations and collaboration.

Chodakiewicz is entangled in a priori defined effect of his own expectations towards his observations. It is hard to accuse him of some deliberate manipulation, since he stressed the need for methodological verification of the figures, although those cases when "the Jews helped Polish Christians" are just important for him<sup>120</sup>. The author uses, in his opinion, very restrictive statistic rules, where only those cases that have a tangible confirmation of the sources are taken into account in the overall number of victims. It is obvious that the result of this kind of study may underestimate the actual number of victims. He uses quite often assumptions, which is not a literal error, especially in the social sciences, however he exposes himself to criticism from the supporters of the Puritan principles of historiography. He undermines the individual parts of

<sup>119</sup> Cf: *ibidem*, pp. 16-18, 210.

<sup>120</sup> See: Statement by Mark J. Chodakiewicz in Jan Pospieszalski's program „Warto rozmawiać”...

the content of documents, rejecting them for formal reasons, the solution that he suggests are “further studies”<sup>121</sup>. Just reaching to the sources does not raise objections, but such an interpretation of them does not allow to determine whether the description of the fact changes. Chodakiewicz examines factography postulatively, does not avoid arguments intended to indicate the reasons for the persecutions of the Jews, which were not of ethnic character, but settling up for previous collaboration<sup>122</sup>. Jan Żaryn gave an interesting assessment of the cited book in the context of polemics with Gross’s theses, stating that “Chodakiewicz [...], cultivating the old empirical school, step-by-step, example after example, analyzes the same subject, avoiding simple generalizations”<sup>123</sup>. Cognitive detail is both a credible research strategy, and equally an effective procedure to exclude inconvenient facts, through a formal denial to one of the components. As a result, only the findings made on the basis of existing sources, usually written documents are considered scientific. Of course, stipulating that he uses statistical data in his research, Chodakiewicz repeatedly refers to the publicistic judgments, which are no more than theorization of facts<sup>124</sup>. Cognitive processes are strictly conditioned by our claims about the understanding of reality, and we often give priority to this. Adopted catalog of moral standards, particularly in relation to issues identified as strictly political phenomena, directs the researcher’s consciousness, forcing him to create a hierarchy of importance of the investigated occurrences<sup>125</sup>. It is easy to miss the moment when the discussion of the facts becomes a projection of their interpretations on the level of conventional political dispute. Chodakiewicz implicitly accepted the hypothesis of the non-anti-Semitic background of Polish crimes against Jews, rightly arguing that circumstances often remain unknown. Nevertheless describing facts from the perspective of a broader social process, he unnecessarily shies away from making this issue a key problem of his research. In his work he tries to recognize the features of Polish-Jewish relations in the years 1944-1947, but the effects of these efforts are only a small contribution for the formulation of intentional conclusion about a statistically lower scale of persecutions of the Jews by the *independentists* (non-communists) [term by M. J. Ch.]. The political reality is fed by generalizations, and these in turn become the basis of established stereotypes. Therefore, separate evidences contradicting the widespread anti-Semitism of Poles are to weaken the value of the politically irritating generalization. Simultaneously they are supported by dissemination of the stereotype of over-representation<sup>126</sup> of Jews in the structures of the Office of Security (UB) and

<sup>121</sup> Cf. e.g. M. J. Chodakiewicz, *op. cit.*, pp. 21, 87, 116, 152.

<sup>122</sup> *Ibidem*, pp. 58-59.

<sup>123</sup> J. Żaryn, *op. cit.*, p. 112.

<sup>124</sup> Cf. T. Klementewicz, *op. cit.*, p. 44.

<sup>125</sup> Cf. Ł. Młyńczyk, *Między kreatywnością a próżnowaniem...*, p. 53.

<sup>126</sup> Cf. P. Śpiewak, *op. cit.*, pp. 149-173.

their leading role in the installation of communism in Poland<sup>127</sup>. Of course, pointing to the stereotypes we have to take into account the fact that reading a numerical value, so that the data become simply a confirmation of the assumptions. The fact is that the number of Jews in the UB was a small percentage, when we relate it to the structure. Nevertheless, it is significant if we limit that to the total population declaring Jewish nationality in Poland after World War II.

Ethno-nationally involved paradigms are not only a confirmation of the intentions of the researchers, but primarily serve falsification of separate views of the same facts. However, such overthrow loses its scientific identification, being the feature of represented political consciousness. In both presented cases, we have to deal with confronting the judgments, which are derived from the protests which are the key ones to the authors' findings, respectively, against anti-Semitism and anti-Polonism.

### **The anti-Jewish methodology or cognitive radicalism?**

The last item, which will serve to illustrate the described assumption, is the controversial book by Norman Finkelstein – *The Holocaust Industry*<sup>128</sup>. Again, what determines the classification of these considerations can be reduced to the scale of discussion about them. In interesting for us the theory-political approach, there are primarily such controversial analyses interpretations of which often exceed the level and scope of the studied matter. The dominant paradigms are challenged not only by the theories that propose a new set of understandings and explanations, but also as a result of a detailed analysis of its base, which is perceived very emotionally. Then a whole series of value judgments appear that can be scientificated only at the level of verification of the reasons for their disclosure. An American political scientist of Jewish origin applied this type of discourse analysis. It can be assumed that the origin is this time a methodological prerequisite for taking up the study of the Holocaust, and the sufficient condition is associated with the fact of personal motivation, because the author's parents experienced life in the Warsaw ghetto and managed to survive the concentration camps<sup>129</sup>. Looking at Finkelstein's methodology considerations, you can see that they deprive the memory of the Holocaust of universal sense. The category<sup>130</sup> of "uniqueness of the Holocaust"<sup>131</sup> was questioned by Finkelstein on the level of the rules of

<sup>127</sup> Cf. P. Machcewicz, *Odcienie czerni* („Tygodnik Powszechny” 2008 nr 2), [in:] *Wokół Strachu...*, pp. 153-154.

<sup>128</sup> N. Finkelstein, *Przedsiębiorstwo holocaust*, Warszawa 2001.

<sup>129</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 17.

<sup>130</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 56.

<sup>131</sup> In the Polish translation of Mateusz Szymański, the word holocaust is consistently spelled in lowercase, while Finkelstein uses in the original two records: *Nazi holocaust* and the concept of

scientific knowledge. It should be noted that the criticism directed at him in any case did not mean plea questioning the Holocaust, but “feeding on the Holocaust”<sup>132</sup> as a set of evaluations alleging the use of the historical experience of the Jews for not only scientific purposes, but more for self-promotional and material motives.

That mutual “use” of the Holocaust as a political or scientific weapon, is a very interesting issue of social research, especially for those people who are not involved. Carl Schmitt in his classic essay wrote that “the right way of recognizing and understanding of the conflict, and thus the right to co-decision and judgment are possible only through the existential involvement and participation. Only the participants themselves can resolve an extreme case of a conflict among each other”<sup>133</sup>. With such an interpretation, it is not possible to meet the precondition and the sufficient condition, despite the fact that they are the effect of non-scientific part of this dispute. Assuming that settlement is impossible, and even unjustified, at the same time a theory-political comment will be appropriate. Generally speaking, the essence of Finkelstein’s doubt expressed in the cognitive part refers to treating science as a sphere of ideological activity<sup>134</sup>. Each activity in the field of historical reasoning or political science can be transposed into general political debate. Scientists often and willingly become active participants of that, but their participation is not a condition *sine qua non* of its legitimacy. Thus, the recognition of the uniqueness of the Holocaust narrows the issue on the level of its recognition and motivation (anti-Semitism) within selected environment of the victims and their descendants, and on the other hand, the generation and origin of the researchers. So unique attributes and powers to conduct research are defined. The result of this is also a tautology: “[...] the Holocaust is unique because it can not be explained, and we can not explain it, because it is unique”<sup>135</sup>. Unlike Finkelstein, we can try to understand the potential absurdity, when we refer to the broader context of functioning of policy of contemporary Jews, which is the result not only of history, but also of today’s political organization which could be hardly accused of high efficiency of functioning. Both parties quite often use ethical arguments, but they do not explain much or explain nothing, because they are invoked as an element of neutralizing the impact of adversaries. The author of *The Holocaust Industry* evokes the category of “intellectual terrorism”, which in a broader perspective includes methodological paradox: “the universality of the Holocaust lies in its uniqueness”, as well as a stipulation that conventional care about the reliability of comparisons is required, not to exacerbate the

---

extermination of the Jews: *the Holocaust*. Only in the first phrase, he uses lowercase. In the text of the article, I use only the spelling with a capital letter.

<sup>132</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 14.

<sup>133</sup> C. Schmitt, *op. cit.*, p. 199.

<sup>134</sup> Cf. N. Finkelstein, *op. cit.*, pp. 58-59.

<sup>135</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 59.

phenomenon of “trivialization of the Holocaust”<sup>136</sup>. The category of “uniqueness” will be represented more effectively in the political than scientific debate. In the case of the latter, a series of questions appear that are not resolved in the field of research, because this “uniqueness” moves beyond scientific dispute.

Affective elements, used to increase antagonisms, are an obstacle to the efficiency of the judgments similar to Finkelstein’s ones. He must face the accusation that he acquired a false image of reality, which he was supposed to expose<sup>137</sup>. Empiricism is a negligible addition of assertions based on methodological fundamentalism. Therefore the extreme method, as well as its antithesis, paradoxically, can not cancel each other, but are transferred to another level, where the dispute has only a purely dialectical effect. It seems obvious that the conclusion: “[...] Jews do not cause anti-Semitism. Anti-Semites cause anti-Semitism”<sup>138</sup>, is a theoretical construction of a higher order. It should be remembered, however, that the social activity of people, such as science, also includes functions activating the masses who organize their way of thinking on the basis of the dominant paradigm. The rejection of this social pattern as a result of scientific falsification does not settle anything at the level of representations. Denial of the facts does not constitute in political science the end of the functioning of political content, especially when the latter has rudimentary characteristics. Social phenomena contain a specific collective identity, understood as their politicization, and pure scientific falsification remain ineffective to their abstractness<sup>139</sup>. The paradigms of the social sciences do not undergo final refutation, but remain available depending on the strength of their influence.

We are dealing with the simultaneous validity of meta-truth and meta-conscience, as enlarging the classic historical phenomena are used in the arena of present political interests. Their aggregation allows gaining protection against exposing function of science, because the historical processes are considered political dogmas. As a result, object of cognition of political scientists is directly dependent on the normative consent to the violation of political consensus, exceeding scientific judgments of researchers.

## Conclusions

The effects of social studies and humanities are conditioned in the same way as the other sciences through epistemological criteria. The main desire is probably the search for truth, but we should be aware of the overwhelming phenomenon of politicization

<sup>136</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 61.

<sup>137</sup> *American Radical: The Trials of Norman Finkelstein*, directed by D. Ridgen, N. Rossier.

<sup>138</sup> N. Finkelstein, *op. cit.*, p. 142.

<sup>139</sup> Cf. Ł. Młyńczyk, *Między kreatywnością a próżnowaniem...*, p. 59.

of scientific content, especially when they touch on the matters which are of fundamental importance for specific communities. Scientists generally represent the averaged states of behavior towards the values of the communities from which they come. We therefore face a literally declared identity of researchers, but parallelly, they can remain under the strong influence of identity understood axiologically. Then, belonging to the supporters of the paradigm will be powered by not only the strictly scientific properties, but also ontic features. The consequences of this identification do not need to have the nature of non-scientific declarations. Usually it is expressed in the language, which is a function of inherited traits of the paradigm. Jerzy Kmita distinguished linguistically dependent scientific explanations, of which the strong point were forcibly temporarily accepted principles of public argumentation and humanistic interpretation, as an expression of imitative experiences<sup>140</sup>. We have, therefore, an apparent epistemological choice. A fundamental question must appear which is conditioned by a principally treated, literally physical experience and mental experiencing of the Holocaust. A group of legitimate researchers has emerged. Shlomo Sand characterizes the epistemological canon:

An intellectual current known as post-Zionism is now found, though marginally, in various academic institutions, and has produced unfamiliar pictures of the past. Sociologists, archaeologists, geographers, political scientists, philologists, and even filmmakers have been challenging the fundamental terms of the dominant nationalism. But this stream of information and insights has not reached the plateau on which resides a certain discipline, called “The History of the Israelite People” in Hebrew academies. These institutions have no departments of history as such, but rather departments of general history—such as the one I belong to—and separate departments of Jewish (Israelite) history. [...] “The Jewish people,” “the ancestral land,” “exile,” “diaspora,” “aliyah,” “Eretz Israel,” “land of redemption” and so forth are key terms in all reconstructions within Israel of the national past, and the refusal to employ them is seen as heretical”<sup>141</sup>.

The immediate effect of such a factual status is excluding people who do not follow the assumptions of Zionist paradigm from the discussion. It is difficult to express surprise that the research community of the history of the Jewish people usurps the right to such a description of the history, which not only serves preserving the memory, but managing political consciousness in relation to the shape and cultivation of the memory as well. The uniqueness of the history of any nation can be determined by the ways of reference to the others, but mainly by assessing its use in the current political debate. We have on the one hand a deep reflection on the unusual, after all, suffering of the Jewish people, worthy of its place in the history of mankind. Any form of trivialization of the *Shoah* is considered as a faux pas and social insult. Of course,

<sup>140</sup> Cf. J. Kmita, *op. cit.*, p. 52.

<sup>141</sup> Sh. Sand, *The Invention of...*, p. x.



this does not prevent from involving the Holocaust in all kinds of comparative studies that are indicating on a scale of suffering of other nations. In this sense, the policy of knowledge controls the mass ideas so precisely that modern Israel's actions in the political arena can not be separated from the entanglement of thinking of recipients in this resonant component of memory. Holocaust and anti-Semitism no longer represent only the category of extermination of European Jews, but also an important reason for extraordinary assigning rightness to political decisions of Israel. At the epistemological level the process of enlargement of the knowledge is combined with the need of a scientist to make his or her own research momentous. The literal relationship of the knower with the object of cognition, which is characteristic of the social sciences, regulates and controls the effects of the inquiries. If, however, some external obstacles appeared, in reserve there is a set of political arguments, of which a large part is already heavily marked in an affective way.

Finally, it is worth considering over the right to use anti-Semitism and the Holocaust as an instrument of political competition. From the point of view of political science analysis, it is sufficient to state this fact, without the necessity to judge it from the normative perspective. It is the legitimacy of the substantial features of their own identity, which is expressed at the highest possible level by what is political. In other words, giving the foundations of collective memory strictly political features, but not in the sense of trivial everyday politicization, allows preserving and perpetuating the most anticipated range of identification attitudes. For this purpose parallel descriptions of history are primarily excluded that would serve the justification of similar acts deserving similar condemnation. Agnieszka Kołakowska recalled Jean-François Revel's judgment, expressed in his book *La Grande Parade: Essai sur la survie de l'utopias socialiste* (Plon, 2000)<sup>142</sup>. He indicates that the necessary constant reminders of genocide of the Jews can not be used as an attempt to obliterate other examples of genocide<sup>143</sup>. Kołakowska proves that giving communism different meaning than its actual perversion in the form of the activities of the Soviet apparatus of repression, becomes a form of whitening the dark history of ideas, while blocking the right to its reliable judgment. This is due to allegedly exposing deep hidden desires to justify Nazism, with its expression in the radical anticommunism<sup>144</sup>. The cognitive error comes here with an open unwillingness to recognize the actual creation of communism as a radically nihilistic system, which was not born as the opposite of Nazism, but as a negation of everything that came from the category of the free world, being in parallel opposition to the ideas,

---

<sup>142</sup> Cf: A. Kołakowska, *Wojny kultur i inne wojny*, „Teologia Polityczna” Warszawa 2015, pp. 114-123.

<sup>143</sup> Cf: *ibidem*, p. 121.

<sup>144</sup> Cf: *ibidem*, pp. 120-121.

plans and actions of the Nazis. Thus, Soviet communism was pragmatically opposed to fascism<sup>145</sup> as a competitor to the creation of the global order. A reliable measure of the real attitude of the communists against the Jews should be that they willingly made them their companions, without necessarily striving for the development of the features of the Jewish people (the fate of Jewish poets in the Soviet Union). Beyond a reasonable doubt, also anti-religious and anti-Zionist traditions existed in Jewish organizations, which allowed the Communists to seek allies for their ideological education after the war<sup>146</sup>. The choice of the Jews themselves was a consequence of the desire to survive, so quite easily they made themselves fit in the world, which because of embarrassment of the right-wing authoritarianisms may have seemed to them the domain of freedom. It is clear that anti-communism has a problem with locating in the mass imagination as the liberal and conservative attitude, not gaining from the anti-Semitism (casus Jewish communism) or radical nationalism, which would be a new incarnation of fascism<sup>147</sup>. Comparative studies help point out one more probability that does not have any chance of scientific verification. Polish anti-Semitism as the attitude of hostility towards the Jewish traits making Poles aware of their own limitations and intellectual deficiencies has never had to lead to a literal extermination of the Jews. In other words, a uniform national Polish state is not a product of ourselves, which many seem not to remember or plead the slip of the tongue. Let the falsifying test of this hypothesis be the fate of former Communists in the Third Republic, whose biological life has never been questioned by anti-Communists.

## Bibliography

- Amsterdamski S., *Tertium non datur? Szkice i polemiki*, Warszawa 1994.  
 Arendt H., *Eichmann in Jerusalem: a Report of the Banality of Evil*, New York 1965.  
 Arendt H., *Eichmann w Jerozolimie. Rzecz o banalności zła*, Kraków 1987.  
 Arendt H., *Korzenie totalitaryzmu*, Warszawa 2014.  
 Arendt H., M. Heidegger, *Korespondencja z lat 1925-1975*, Warszawa 2010.  
 Arendt H., *Pisma żydowskie*, Warszawa 2012.  
 Arendt H., *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, Cleveland-New York 1962.  
 Baron-Cohen S., *Teoria zła: o empatii i genezie okrucieństwa*, Sopot 2014.  
 Bernstein R. J., *Hannah Arendt and the Jewish Question*, Cambridge (MA) 1996.  
 Beyme von K., *Współczesne teorie polityczne*, Warszawa 2005.  
 Chodakiewicz M. J., *Po Zagładzie: stosunki polsko-żydowskie 1944-1947*, Warszawa 2008.  
 Dawkins R., *Bóg urojony*, Warszawa 2007.

<sup>145</sup> The journalistic discourse does not differentiate between the concepts of Fascism and Nazism, which results in assigning the Germans Nazi fascist attitudes, but this should be considered an imprecise qualification. In the Soviet Union, and Russia they used more often the concept of fascism, likely to eliminate all the negative connotations with socialism.

<sup>146</sup> Cf: T. Segev, *op. cit.*, p. 80.

<sup>147</sup> Cf: A. Kołakowska, *op. cit.*, p. 123.

- Dr. Wilhelm Stuckart – Biography <https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/biography/Stuckart.html> [access: 20.02.2016].
- Dulas A., *W naszych rodzinach jest strach: z Anną Niewiadomską-Milczarek o jej żydowskich korzeniach i życiu w Łodzi rozmawia Aleksandra Dulas*, <http://lodzkagazeta.pl/w-naszych-rodzinachjest-strach/> [access: 3.02.2016].
- Finkelstein N., *Przedsiębiorstwo holocaust*, Warszawa 2001.
- Foucault M., *Nadzorować i karać: narodziny więzienia*, Warszawa 2009.
- Fukuyama F., *Koniec historii*, Kraków 2009.
- Gawin D., *Leo Strauss – antyczny filozof i żydowski mędrzec*, „Teologia Polityczna”, Rocznik filozoficzny nr 4/autumn 2006 – summer 2007.
- Grobler A., *Metodologia nauk*, Kraków 2006.
- Gross J.T., *Strach: Antysemityzm w Polsce tuż po wojnie. Historia moralnej zapaści*, Kraków 2008.
- Hazon Y., *Israel Through European Eyes*, „Jerusalem Letters” 14 July 2010 <http://via.readerimpact.com/v/1/792bc4b1ec4cad1e102bfb9bbcc0325c6b7210346658c26c> [access: 8.02.2016].
- Hegel G.W.F., *Wykłady o filozofii dziejów*, Warszawa 2003.
- Herzfeld M., *Zażyłość kulturowa: poetyka społeczna w państwie narodowym*, Kraków 2007.
- Hilberg R., *Pamięć i polityka: droga historyka Zagłady*, Warszawa 2012.
- Hilberg R., *Zagłada Żydów Europejskich*, volumns I-III, Warszawa 2014.
- Huntington S. P., *Zderzenie cywilizacji i nowy kształt ładu światowego*, Warszawa 2001.
- Jacobson H., *The Finkler Question*, London 2010.
- Jodkowski K., *Nienaukowy fundament nauki*, [in:], *Granice nauki*, Z. Pietrzak (edit.) „Lectiones & Acroases Philosophicae” 2013, vol. VI, nr 1.
- Klementewicz T., *Rozumienie polityki. Zarys metodologii nauki o polityce*, Warszawa 2011.
- Kłopotowski K., *Geniusz Żydów na polski rozum*, Warszawa 2015.
- Kmita J., *Wymykanie się uniwersaliom*, Warszawa 2000.
- Kołakowska A., *Wojny kultur i inne wojny*, „Teologia Polityczna” Warszawa 2015.
- Kuhn T. S., *Struktura rewolucji naukowych*, Warszawa 2009.
- Kuhn T. S., *The Structure of Scientific Revolution*, Chicago 1970.
- Libionka D., „Kwestia żydowska” – myślenie za pomocą clichés. „Odrodzenie” 1935-1939. *Przyczynek do historii antysemityzmu w Polsce*, „Dzieje Najnowsze”, Yearbook XXVII, 1995 No. 3.
- Lilla M., *Koniec polityki*, „Teologia Polityczna”, Rocznik filozoficzny nr 4/jesień 2006 – lato 2007.
- Młyńczyk Ł., *Koincydencja jako alternatywa dla „krytycznego racjonalizmu Poppera”*, „Athenaeum. Polskie Studia Politologiczne”, No. 26/2010.
- Młyńczyk Ł., *Między kreatywnością a próżnowaniem. Polityczność dwóch typów idealnych*, Warszawa 2015.
- Mokrzycki E., *Do nauki przychodzi się nie tylko z pytaniami*, Warszawa 2007.
- Nałczadźjan A., *Intuicja a odkrycia naukowe*, Warszawa 1979.
- Nowak S., *Metodologia badań społecznych*, Warszawa 2010.
- Osiatyński W., *Zrozumieć świat: rozmowy z uczonymi 25 lat później*, Warszawa 2009.
- Popper K. R., *Społeczeństwo otwarte i jego wrogowie, tom 2: wysoka fala prorocत्व: Hegel, Marks i następstwa*, Warszawa 2006.
- Protokół narady w Wannsee*, <http://www.majdanek.com.pl/obozy/dokumenty/wannsee.html>, [access: 1.02.2016].
- Sand Sh., *Kiedy wynaleziono naród żydowski*, Warszawa 2013 [ebook].
- Sand Sh., *The Invention of the Jewish People*, London – New York 2009.
- Schmitt C., *Pojęcie polityczności*, [in:] Idem, *Teologia polityczna i inne pisma*, Kraków 2000.
- Segev T., *Siodmy Milion. Izrael – piętno Zagłady*, Warszawa 2012.
- Skarżyński R., *Od chaosu do ładu: Carl Schmitt i problem tego, co polityczne*, Warszawa 2012.
- Stefaniuk P., *Noty do wydania polskiego*, [in:] R. Hilberg, *Zagłada Żydów Europejskich*, t. I, Warszawa 2014.
- Stefaniuk P., *Teoria polityki*, [in:] *Aspekty metodologiczne oraz teoretyczne w subdyscyplinach politologii*, Ł. Młyńczyk, B. Nitschke (edit.), Toruń 2013.
- Sułęk A., *Eksperyment w badaniach społecznych*, Warszawa 1979.

Śpiewak P., *Żydokomuna: interpretacje historyczne*, Warszawa 2012.

Topolski J., *Rozumienie historii*, Warszawa 1978.

Weber M., *Gospodarka i społeczeństwo: zarys socjologii rozumiejącej*, Warszawa 2002.

Żaryn J., *Pogarda dla kontekstu* („Rzeczpospolita”, 19-20 January 2008), [in:] *Wokół Strachu: dyskusja o książce Jana T. Grossa* (choice and layout of the texts by M. Gądek), Kraków 2008.

### Pictures

*American Radical: The Trials of Norman Finkelstein*, directed by D. Ridgen, N. Rossier.

*Ostateczne rozwiązanie [Conspiracy]*, directed by F. Pierson, prod. USA, Great Britain 2001

Statement by Mark J. Chodakiewicz in Jan Pospieszalski's program „Warto rozmawiać” (TVP on 14.01.2008), <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iwl6S-D1t50> [access: 21.02.2016].

*Wszystko, co kocham*, directed by J. Borcuch, prod. Polska 2009.

### Political cognition. Can scientific paradigms change cognitive status of anti-Semitism and the Holocaust in the history of the Jewish people?

#### ABSTRACT

The purpose of this article is to look at selected positions devoted to issues of historical experience of the Jewish people for their research strategy and their corresponding or lack of dominant research paradigms. The basic intention is to indicate the path of political science to know the history of the nation, through limited exemplification as a response to the absolutization of the research results before they are published to be limited exclusively to the study of the Jews, as the people, especially experienced by the history, which enforces appropriate research approaches. If we reduce the judgment of contemporary phenomena and problems concerning the Jews to the stereotypical anti-Semitism, then any knowledge does not make much sense, because everything important is explained and closed in one cause. Something else is identifying antipathy as an act of anti-Semitism, and quite something else its formal manifestation. On the basis of science, you can examine any antipathy towards minorities alike, and if we assume a separate code for the Jews, then we forget that the function of science is discovering, not decreeing the result.

### Polityka poznania. Czy paradygmaty naukowe mogą zmieniać kognitywny status antysemityzmu oraz Holocaustu w dziejach narodu żydowskiego?

#### STRESZCZENIE

Celem tego artykułu jest przyjrzenie się wybranym pozycjom poświęconym zagadnieniom historycznych doświadczeń narodu żydowskiego pod kątem strategii badawczej i jej korespondowania lub braku z dominującymi w badaniach paradygmatami. Podstawową intencją jest wskazanie politologicznej ścieżki poznania dziejów narodu, poprzez ograniczoną egzemplifikację, jako odpowiedź na absolutyzację wyników badań przed ich opublikowaniem, by ograniczyły się one wyłącznie do badania Żydów, jako narodu szczególnie doświadczanego przez historię, co wymusza stosowne podejścia badawcze. Jeżeli zredukujemy osąd współczesnych zjawisk i problemów dotyczących Żydów do stereotypowego antysemityzmu, wówczas jakiegokolwiek poznanie nie ma większego sensu, ponieważ wszystko, co istotne zostało wyjaśnione i zamknięte w jednej przyczynie. Czymś innym jest rozpoznawanie antypatii jako aktu antysemityzmu, a zgoła czymś innym jego formalny przejaw. Na gruncie nauki można badać każdą antypatię wobec mniejszości podobnie, natomiast jeśli założymy osobny kod dla Żydów, wtedy zapominamy, że funkcją nauki jest odkrywanie, a nie dekretowanie wyniku.