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Mainstreaming the right-wing radicalism and extremism: basic approaches and perceptions from Georgian academia

Introduction

Contemporary political science is becoming more and more professional and differentiated. Although the academic field was founded a few decades ago, a similar trend can be observed in Georgia, a post-Soviet country located in South Caucasus. Similar to other academic disciplines, in political science, issues get and lose researchers' attention over time. Nowadays, right-wing radicalism, extremism and the far-right are on the stage of academic interest. It can be explained by two major reasons. Firstly, the mentioned issues have been popular in academics since the 1970s, but in the last decade, the visibility and electoral success of (far) right-wing radical and extremist parties and forces have also increased scientific attention. From this point of view, political science in Georgia is mainly in line with the tendencies of Western academic schools. Due to its path to Europeanization and Westernization, academics tend to keep up with the same trends, also in the field of science and research (Tabatadze, 2019). The second reason can be linked to international donor organizations that highlight and fund projects and analytical instruments to be implemented focusing on the growing support of (far) right-wing radical and extremist organizations. In Georgia, the mentioned issues are popular among non-government organizations (NGOs) that usually meet the thematic criteria of donors.

The paper aims to compare the major approaches to the concepts of right-wing radicalism and extremism and, in this perspective, to critically review and analyze perceptions from Georgian academia. To achieve this goal, tasks are set up as follows: identifying and categorizing key approaches to the concepts of right-wing radicalism and extremism; finding and analyzing relevant academic and research papers in Georgian language. Therefore, the research question of the paper can be formulated as follows: What are the characteristics of the academic and research literature when using the concepts

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of right-wing radicalism and right-wing extremism in Georgia? The paper uses a combination of qualitative (document analysis) and quantitative (content analysis) research methods. The selection covers scientific and academic articles, policy briefs, research reports, MA and PhD theses that are published in Georgian language. Thus, the major tool of research is coding, using codes: extreme right, radical right and far-right. Firstly, in Google Scholar, all kinds of papers are searched and selected, then the frequency table is presented and explained and finally, the qualitative critical analysis is presented.

This article is divided into three parts. The first covers formulation and categorization of the concepts and ideas of radical and extremist right-wing. It discusses the similarities and differences between approaches and authors. The second part critically analyzes Georgian literature, namely: scientific/academic papers, reports published by research organizations and policy documents. Also, the problems of terminological misunderstanding and perceptions from Georgian academics are outlined. Lastly, the conclusion is reached.

Radical and extreme right: Concepts and major approaches

The academic debates on right-wing radicalism or extremism have been articulated over decades and are getting more and more attention by scholars. It can be explained by the electoral success and increased visibility of far-right movements and parties (Mudde, 2016). However, it is still unclear how to explain and determine these concepts. Generally, the problem of terminological uncertainty is typical for political science, but concepts: right-wing extremism, right-wing radicalism and far-right also have practical importance and application. From this point of view, the most effective and systematic classification is given by Gilles Ivaldi, who identified two major academic camps: Anglo-Saxon and German schools (Ivaldi, 2004). According to the author, radical and extremist rights are synonymous with the proponents of the first school, and the concept of far-right is often used interchangeably, while the German experience, due to its history and experience, clearly distinguish between radical and extremist dimensions of right, due to the state history (Ivaldi, 2004). To clearly understand the basic approaches of these schools, we critically overview the contexts and contents of radical right and extremist right perspectives and their relations.

Academic papers using the concept of right-wing radicalism often present it as an ideology and/or political position that expresses opposition to the principles of liberal democracy and equality (Mudde, 2007). Often the term demonstrates the reactional position that seeks to protect existing moral values, norms and institutions. Sometimes, it is associated with anti-systemic populism, ethnonationalism, and even xenophobia (Jupkas, Segers 2020). Its characteristics include support for hierarchical and conflicting relationships in society, which in turn implies the 'we and they' dichotomy (Bobbio, 1996).

We can assume that nowadays it is difficult to imagine Europe without radical right-wing ideology (Art, 2011). This is why it is likely that the content of the notion of right-wing radicalism was supplemented precisely through the analysis of the political values of European parties and movements with similar political positions. However, interestingly, no political party, civil movement or activist calls itself a right-wing radical, since the term has acquired a negative connotation (Jupkas, Segers, 2020). As Cas Mudde points out, the term gained widespread popularity in the wake of the rise of fascist movements after World War II, although over time, it is often seen as synonymous with far-right. Mudde assumes that the notion of radical right no longer implies the existence of a fascist experience for a party or movement (Mudde, 1995; 2007). Scholars mostly agree that radical right-wing movements and parties do not only operate on national, but also on the international level. The major reason lies in its internationalization, which is linked to the processes of globalization, even for right-wing politics (Mering, McCarty, 2013). However, the question of what exactly we should mean by the concept of right-wing radicalism and how to distinguish it from other notions remains open.

As for the concept of right-wing extremism, academic literature presents it largely as an ideology or political position characterized by support for anti-democratic perspective and politically motivated violence (Mudde, 2007; Snow, Cross, 2011). On the one hand, the anti-democratic stance on the principle of equality is associated with issues such as fundamental human rights and freedoms, and fair and free elections (Carter, 2005); and, on the other hand, politically motivated violence implies such anti-constitutional and law-breaking actions that are simply contrary to the liberal and democratic order (Merkl, Weinberg, 1997). Sometimes extremist right is associated with racism, authoritarianism, anti-Semitism, and even conspiracy theories (Jupkas, Segers, 2020). Thus, it involves sharing ideas supporting preserving national, religious and cultural identity from so-called enemies, like immigrants, ethnic, sexual, religious minorities, liberals and feminists (Randaval, 2016).

Mudde outlines five key features of right-wing extremism. These are nationalism, racism, xenophobia, anti-democracy and strong state/authoritarianism (Mudde, 1995). In general, nationalism is seen as a sign of ethnocentrism, which in turn implies linking the national idea to a specific ethnic and cultural identity and upholding the principles of collective homogeneity (Copsey, 2008; Minkenberg, 2003; Eatswell, 2000; Betz, Jonson, 2004). To nationalism, Mudde adds the notion of nativism which is based on the idea that a particular nativist group should live in the territory of the state and that no one else should harm a holistic, unified state (Mudde, 2007). Racism and xenophobia are also seen as characters describing extreme right by other authors claiming that sharing the idea of natural and racial inequality, superiority and hostility covers the content of right-wing extremism that is often reflected in criticism of anti-discrimination decisions and support of ideas of cultural incompatibility (Heinisch, 2003; Minkenberg, 2003). More specifically, it can be called ethnonationalist xenophobia (Rydgen, 2005).

The fourth characteristic is anti-democracy, manifested by the rejection of fundamental principles of equality and political pluralism. According to other authors, right-wing extremism is characterized by a rejection of the existing social and political system and principles, which makes it an anti-liberal and anti-pluralist political ideology (Betz, Jonson, 2004; Givens, 2005 ; Minkenberg, 2003). Finally, in a strong state, both law and order are usually considered (Mudde, 1995; Copsey, 2008), as well as authoritarianism (Hainsworth, 2008).

It is also noteworthy that almost no political party, movement or activist identifies itself as a right-wing extremist, as the term is quite stigmatized and in some states, extremism is punishable by law (Klandermans, Mayer, 2006). Later, Mudde explains right-wing extremism as an ideology characterized by exclusivism (including racism and anti-Semitism) and populism. For him, extremism is not a political style or tactic, but an ideology based on the belief that society is inherently divided into two opposing camps: a pure people and a corrupt elite, and thus, politics must be an expression of the general will of the people (Mudde, 2002).

Overview of the concepts of radical right and extremist right has given us opportunities to address several issues. Firstly, misunderstandings are clear. For instance, some features of radical right are so general and comprehensive that they can be used to assess any conservative or nationalist political position. Secondly, it is still unclear what critique of liberal democracy means for right-wing radicalism and how it differs from the notion of illiberal democracy. Thirdly, although the concept of extremist right focuses on non-peaceful political tactics, it still fails to answer the question of what norms and values the extremist right seeks to establish and spread around. Therefore, if extremist right is mostly based on politically motivated violence, it is getting synonymous with right-wing terrorism or simply terrorism. Last but not least, notions of right-wing radicalism or extremism operate with the practical political process and, therefore, academic literature somehow is dependent on the current political messages or tactics of radical/extremist/far-right groups, movements and parties. From this point of view, the role of media is quite important in terms of labelling parties or movements as radical, extremist or far-right.

Astrid Bioticher claims that dividing lines between radical right and extremist right are confused in academic and everyday vocabulary. However, the author believes that, based on the German tradition, radicalism and extremism come from different sociopolitical movements and sources and merging them seems to be less possible. Indeed, the notion of radicalism dates back to the 18th century, while extremism is associated with post-World War II Germany. As Bioticher notes, extremism lacks scientific conceptualization, and the term was originally used as an antithesis to West German constitutional values. The author also reviews the Anglo-Saxon experience and notes that although enemies have been referred to as extremists since the Middle Ages, the term gained special popularity after World War I, when Senator Daniel Webster described

pro-slavery advocates as extremists. To sum up, Bioticher believes right-wing extremism is an expression of anti-establishment and anti-elite positions associated with dogmas, intolerance, and sometimes uncompromising and violent actions as politics are seen as a zero-sum game (Bioticher, 2017).

Hence, there are two main approaches to the concepts of right-wing radicalism and right-wing extremism. The first covers the authors who distinguish these concepts from each other, while the second uses them as synonyms and often replaces them with far-right. After critical analysis of academic literature, we can assume that scholars mostly divide concepts of radical right and extremist right. The major principle can be formulated as follows: radicalism refers to ideas that are within the framework of democracy but are illiberal (meaning that right-wing radicalism opposes the liberal aspects of democracy, but does not support politically motivated violence), while extremism opposes anti-democratic framework and does not exclude violent acts (Mudde, 2007; Ivaldi, 2004).

Based on previous assumptions, it turns out that the right-wing radicals support the principles of popular and majoritarian sovereignty, although they are opposed to issues such as the protection of minority rights, the principles of separation of powers and others. From this perspective, there are several mismatches. Firstly, if the radical right is democratic, but anti-liberal political position, how does it differ from the characteristics of an illiberal democracy? With the given conceptualization, it differs mostly with nothing. Secondly, to what extent is it possible for an activist, movement, or political party in a liberal-democratic political system to oppose only one aspect of it and at the same time support the general framework? With such an explanation, it seems to be less realistic. And finally, how does such a conceptualization of right-wing radicalism differ from any political organization/position that simply does not share liberal ideology? With such a conceptualization, any conservative or nationalist party that opposes liberalism could be considered radical right-wing. Therefore, the given approach (that radical right is democratic, but anti-liberal position) contains risks for all non-centrist groups, movements or parties to be assessed as radical.

The second group of authors, who rely mainly on the ideas of the Anglo-Saxon school, use the concepts of radical and extremist rights interchangeably. Moreover, the relatively less problematic term far-right is used frequently (Ivaldi, 2004; Hainsworth, 2008). Thus, the lack of fascist experience and the anti-globalist, anti-liberal political messages made radical right a relative concept in Anglo-Saxon academic literature. From this perspective, right-wing radicalism and extremism both aim for fundamental social change that implies a rejection of the core principles of liberal democracy (Beck, Colin, 2016). However, this approach also raises several questions. Firstly, if right-wing radicalism and extremism are synonymous and include the use of violence, then what is called a political party, group, or activist who shares similar political positions, but remains within the framework of peace and democracy? Secondly, if radical or extremist right tries to push fundamental social change, how does it differ from the goals of the radical left?

Finally, if the terms radical, extremist, and far-right are similar, how do we distinguish between ultranationalist, neo-fascist, or violent political parties, movements, and activists? With the given approach anyone who even speaks out against liberal democracy is an extremist, radical or far right.

Despite many scholars studying the concepts and phenomena of radical, extremist or far-right, and useful and rich information and data have been collected, processed and explained, there is still no consensus in the academic literature on what do we mean under these concepts. Elizabeth Carter tries to explain what could be the reason for this and specifically what the academic community disagrees with. Thus, Carter shares the principle of Giovanni Sartori on the study of the concepts that means firstly to collect all the definitions, then to identify their major characteristics, and finally to build a summary matrix (Sartori, 1984). Carter believes that the common between definitions of radical right and extremist right is that both are ideologies and both are right-wing (Carter, 2018). When it comes to differences, Hans-Georg Betz points out that modern radical right-wing parties and movements differ from extremists in that they do not reject the principles of a democratic framework such as the protection of individual liberty, fundamental rights and equality (Betz, 1998). Similarly, Michael Minkenberg notes that the new radical right, unlike its predecessors, looks less anti-democratically (Minkenberg, 2003). Damir Skenderovic assumes that both radical and extremist right covers some features of ultra-nationalism and xenophobia, but right-wing radicalism, unlike extremism, does not express hostility to democratic values (Skenderovic, 2010). Nigel Kopsey believes modern radical right-wing movements do not have revolutionary attitudes towards the liberal-democratic agenda (Kopsey, 2008).

It is noteworthy that Piero Ignazi divides right-wing extremist movements into two parts: old and new. The main reason for the classification is the positions of the fascist legacy and political system. According to Ignazi, the old right-wing extremist forces are characterized by neo-Nazi and neo-Fascist ideologies, while the new ones focus on issues of nationalism and anti-immigration (Ignazi, 1992). Interestingly, Montserrat Guibernau is called the last one New Radical Righ". By her logic, this notion refers to political ideas and positions (and the groups and parties behind them) that criticizes the status quo and hold anti-elite positions. Thus, it is often associated with nationalism and populism mixed with anti-immigration policies, anti-establishment rhetoric, focusing on the importance of protection of Western values and homogeneity of the nation (Guibernau, 2010). As Geoff Dean, Peter Bell and Zarina Vakhitova point out, New Radical Right can be characterized by six major features:1) anti-immigration rhetoric (implies a sharply negative attitude towards immigrants and refugees and their perception of incompatibility with Western values and national cultural identity); 2) anti-elitist position (complete discrediting of the political elite and their policies that are seen as corrupt); 3) self-identification as supporters of Western values (focus on issues such as prioritizing one's own culture and language and offering a better social welfare

package as a tool of cultural protectionism); 4) democratic reform (strengthening direct and plebiscite democracy by increasing referendums, at the same time, accusing parties and politicians of bargaining and institutional elitism); 5) self-identification as a true defender of traditional values(critique of multiculturalism as a doomed ideological and globalist project because of its anti-national nature; support for policies of welfare chauvinism); 6) law and order (focus on restoring national dignity and recognizing the state as the main guarantor of cultural and national identity) (Dean, Bell, Vakhitova, 2016: 123-124).

To sum up this part, some of the definitions of the radical new right and right-wing extremists are more or less similar. However, it does not mean that problem is solved. The concepts of radical and extremist right are still overloaded with different definitions and from this point of view, using far-right can be seen as a temporary solution, but it is not the best way out from terminological uncertainty.

Radical and extreme right: Perceptions from Georgian academia

There is an obvious interest in the issues of radical and extremist right in Georgian academic literature. It can be explained by different reasons. Firstly, in recent years, such organizations and groups have emerged in Georgia that share far/radical/extreme right-wing political stances. However, their influence is quite weak and fragmented (Tabatadze, 2019). Secondly, the salience of this issue in European academia plays an important role in publishing local (Georgian) research and analytical papers on the issue. As most analytical and scientific projects are Europeanized and mainly funded by Western foundations, the increasing popularity of the issue of far/radical/extreme right-wing politics can be seen as a copied transfer from European academia. For this article, we have searched papers (published online) written in the last five years. The results show that the number of papers focusing on the far/radical/extreme right is increasing year by year. The selected papers can be divided into four main parts: scientific articles, research reports, policy reports/blogs, MA/PhD thesis. In each case, we studied which concept (far/radical/extreme right) with what context and characteristics are used. Results show that the concept of far-right is used most often (the possible explanations are already discussed above). It is also interesting that the term right-wing extremism is less commonly used than right-wing radicalism. However, it should be noted that in 12 of the 24 papers, the above terms are complementary and are used interchangeably. Only three papers cite a theoretical source, two of them rely Mudde's understanding, while one paper shares the paradigm of the new radical right. To discuss the issue in-depth, a critical analysis of each paper is presented.

All scientific articles (focused on far/radical/extreme right) are presented in the scientific journal politics. Malkhaz Matsaberidze studies the origins of Georgian Fascism, using the terms of radical extremism and right-wing ideology. He claims that it can be

characterized by integral nationalism that links to an illiberal and sometimes totalitarian approach to public rules (Matsaberidze, 2019: 4). The aim of Nino Maisuradze's scientific article is to analyze the ideological profile of Georgian national-patriotic online pages. Her article presents four associations with such internet profiles: *The Kingdom of Georgia*, *Georgian Idea*, *Cardhu* and *National Unity of Georgia*. The author uses the term national-patriotic as these groups identify themselves in this way. However, there is no source in the article that would show us clearly that all four groups call their organization national-patriotic. Secondly, it is necessary to find out why these groups all identify themselves as national-patriotic if their social network-based ideological profile is different. Finally, it is also stated that the goal of selected groups is "to spread and strengthen anti-Western sentiments" (Maisuradze, 2019: 24), but the author's review of the identifying features of these organizations is lacking. Levan Lortkiphanidze's article aims to present the main trends in the development of radical right-wing parties in the EU member states in the 2010s. The author uses the term radical right-wing parties' and lists the major characteristics. He assumes that radical right-wing parties have five main features. First, different political identity and platform from the traditional, conservative, Christian-Democratic, and centre-right party families; second, the soft and hard manifestations of Euroscepticism; third, support for nationalistic and cultural homogeneity with a clear distinction between indigenous and non-indigenous peoples focusing on race, culture, religion, language and ethnicity; fourth, the anti-liberal critique of democracy and the sharing of ethnocracy; and fifth, to portray anti-elite populist rhetoric: pure people against a corrupt elite (Lortkiphanidze, 2018). We can identify problematic issues while the author characterizes right-wing radicalism. Firstly, it remains unclear if Lortkipanidze vividly distinguishes concepts of the radical and extreme right. Although the author shares the idea of separating these terms, at the same time, he considers the latter to be a variety of former and sometimes use them interchangeably. Also, the author points out that both Euroscepticism and anti-elitist populism are equally characteristic of the radical right, and with such a typology it follows that some radical right parties may be populist and some Eurosceptic that cannot always be realistic. Eka Darbaidze's scientific articles refer to the study of the political stances and party leaders' positions of the French National Rally, mainly its transformation and gender policy. It should be noted that in both articles, the following concepts are used synonymously with each other: far-right, radical right-wing populist, the radical right, extreme right. It seems to be vague as the author does not offer any theoretical framework or explanation of what exactly is meant by an extreme, radical or far right. Despite the terminological uncertainty, it is still possible to distinguish the characteristics of these synonymous concepts from the article: anti-immigration policy, anti-elitism, the existence of a charismatic leader, self-identification in support of popular sovereignty and anti-Islamic rhetoric. After listing these features, it is more difficult to find out why the author identifies them as extreme right and not radicals (Darbaidze, 2020a; 2020b).

Policy papers and blogs published by research organizations are mainly submitted by the Georgian Policy Institute (GIP). Nino Kvirikashvili uses the term far-right in her blog, noting that it displays anti-minority, especially anti-LGBTQ, rhetoric and uses full freedom of expression to restrict the fundamental freedom of expression of other groups (Kvirikashvili, 2021). Nino Gozalishvili also uses the same concept, noting far-right groups are characterized by anti-liberal and nationalist views, closeness to the Orthodox Church, homophobic and anti-immigration policies (Gozalishvili, 2020). Salome Kandelaki uses the term right-wing nationalist extremists to identify supporters of the Georgian March and Union of Orthodox Parents. She claims right-wing nationalist extremism is linked to appeal to religious sentiments and traditions and the loss of Georgianness (Kandelaki, 2019). Adriana Stephan uses the term far-right groups and considers them as anti-liberals. Their rhetoric ranges sharply from pro-Orthodox to neo-Fascist. The author points out that radical, extremist and far-right are synonymous. However, the paper does not explain what the concept of the far-right means, what groups hold key political positions and why the author uses it (Stephan, 2020). Salome Minesashvili uses the term far-right. Interestingly, for the author, political party the Alliance of Patriots of Georgia "is considered a far-right populist party" (Minesashvili, 2019: 1). The author notes that this type of nationalist party is characterized by anti-liberal and anti-immigration rhetoric. She claims the far-right can be portrayed as anti-immigrant, anti-minority, anti-gender equality, anti-liberal and anti-multicultural policies with racist and xenophobic rhetoric and anti-Western sentiments (Minesashvili, 2019). The title of Tamta Melashvili's policy document states that the author discusses the political possibilities of right-wing extremism in Georgia. She develops the concept based on Mudde's approach (extremism covers both anti-constitutionalism and anti-democracy). The author believes that Georgian organizations, like Georgian March, Georgian Idea and National Unity of Georgia, meet both of these criteria (Melashvili, 2019). However, several issues arise after a critical overview of her article. Firstly, the policy paper lists several groups and forces that, according to the author, fully fit the definition of right-wing extremism, yet does not explain exactly where and how their anti-constitutionality and anti-democracy are manifested. Although the paper fragmentary discusses examples of acts of violence in Georgia, it is still unclear why she labels these organizations/groups as extreme right-wing. Secondly, the interchangeability of terms remains problematic. The author at the same time uses radical populist right, radical right and far-right as synonyms for extremism. If she thinks that all mentioned concepts are a combination of anti-constitutional and anti-democratic elements, then it is unclear how it can be based on Mudde's conceptualization. Hence, in this policy document, at least a terminological misunderstanding can be found.

Based on the regression analysis of the results of the NDI Public Opinion Survey, Salome Minesashvili concludes how to explain the support of right-wing populist and far-right positions. The author uses right-wing populist and nationalist-populist sentiments

as synonyms that mean nationalism equals right-wing populism. At the same time, she does not define features of far or right-wing populist forces. In the paper, party support is presented as a major independent variable for far-right populist positions that is a rather controversial and groundless argument. Also, Minesashvili, without any vivid criteria, characterizes quite different foreign, economic or culturally-oriented political parties as right-wing populists. The author concludes that citizens aged 56 and over, living in rural areas, with Soviet nostalgia and anti-Western foreign policy positions are the most supportive of these parties and therefore, far-right populists (Minesashvili, 2020). Using the case of Georgian March, Irakli Jgarkava explains the characteristics of Georgian far-right groups and its similarities with discourse in Europe. The author uses the term far-right (interchangeably with extremist rights) that covers strengthening anti-migration policies and rhetoric in Europe and Georgia (Jgarkava, 2017). In the policy brief, Alexander Kvakhadze (2018) uses the term far-right group" that are equated with hate groups. The author claims Georgian far-right is hostile to immigrants, the LGBT community, blacks, Jews, Muslims and other groups. Kvakhadze notes far-right organizations are tools of the soft power of Russia on the one hand, and do not protest against Russian occupation on the other hand. Thus, the author assumes far-right groups in Georgia intensify anti-Western rhetoric. However, it is unclear how the author defines the far-right and how it is connected to hate groups (Kvakhadze, 2018).

Research-based reports, belonging to different organizations, assess the issue of radical and extremist right-wing from different perspectives. The title of the paper of the Democracy Research Institute, *Understanding and Combating Far-Right Extremism and Ultranationalism in Georgia* shows which term the authors might have preferred. It should be noted that the following concepts are explained as follows: "far-right groups – associations that use xenophobic, nationalist and homophobic rhetoric and stir up anti-liberal and anti-Western sentiments; far-right discourse – an ideology based on racism, xenophobia, misogyny, anti-Semitism and homophobia" (Democracy Research Institute, 2019: 4). It is noteworthy that the concept of extremism used in the title cannot be found in the paper at all ,and the far-right is sometimes used as a synonym with radical right-wing. Authors, studying online activities of selected organizations and groups, portray far-right as anti-liberal, anti-Western, xenophobic and homophobic, and at the same time pro-Russian rhetoric. However, terminological ambiguity is obvious. Also, the paper does not present the criteria based on which the researchers consider online-published information to be pro-Russian, anti-liberal or xenophobic. Thus, just listing and naming them as far-right looks like to be the practice of groundless labelling.

The report published by the Caucasus Research Resource Center deals with the activities of the Radical Right groups in the online media. It should be noted that there is no specified explanation or theoretical framework of what the author means under the concept. The comprehensive study covered 70 social media pages, but if there is no conceptualization of radical right-wing, how are these groups and their media pages select-

ed? The report also notes that the radical right social media pages are focused on issues such as sharply negative positions on drug liberalization and the rights of sexual minorities and on liberal democracy in general. Content analysis of these pages showed that Europe and the EU are associated with anti-discrimination policies, Russia with the enemy and Turkey with economic coercion. Interestingly, other studies (like DRI, 2019) show that far/radical/extreme right groups either avoid talking about or support re-negotiation with Russia. The different results of the study can be explained by the selection of these social media pages that lack conceptualization itself (Caucasus Research Resource Center, 2018).

In the review of global trends in terrorism, Mariam Tokhadze focuses on the spread of terrorism and uses the term right-wing terrorism which is linked to right-wing extremism. The author relies on the view that extreme right is characterized by neo-Fascist, neo-Nazi, and ultranationalist forms (Tokhadze, 2020: 4). The paper also notes that extremism is based on hate, violence and is featured by supremacism – the principle that a group of people united by common ethnic, national, linguistic and/or religious affiliation is more superior and privileged than others. The author notes that right-wing extremist organizations are less structured and rely on the demonization of alternative groups, use dichotomic, dualistic (us and them) rhetoric and share conspiracy theories. However, the concept of radical right is used in different parts of the paper without any vivid conceptualization. Thus, terminological uncertainty and confusion can be outlined.

Gvantsa Jibladze, Dariko Bakhturidze and Nana Chabukiani's research on the reasons for the limited space of female and queer activists point out that radical right-wing groups are key players in this point of view. The authors believe that radical right means anti-liberal and anti-Western agendas, on the one hand, and openly xenophobic, homophobic and nationalist ideas, on the other hand (Jibladze, Bakhturidze, Chabukiani, 2020: 8). The authors assume that radical right-wing groups portray feminists and queers as enemies of national identity and Orthodox Christianity of Georgia. However, it is still unclear what exactly is meant by anti-Western and anti-liberal rhetoric and how they define which groups are radical right and which not.

Finally, what about the MA and PhD thesis connected to this issue, we can outline that three papers use the term radical right (Beqaia, 2018; Shaphakidze, 2018; Kaphianidze, 2017). The concept of extremist right can be found in two papers (Gelashvili, 2019; Kupreishvili, 2019), while Ketevan Murgulia uses the term far-right (Murgulia, 2019).

Conclusions

To sum up, the problem of terminological ambiguity between the concepts of radical and extremist rights remains a challenge for scholars both in the world and in Georgia. Although there have been many attempts to bring the experiences of German and Anglo-Saxon schools closer together, it is clear that different authors use different terms differ-

ently in similar contexts. Moreover, these concepts are mostly applied while discussing particular political parties, movements and activities that makes it harder to differentiate radical and extremist characteristics. The result of the study shows that in Georgia the issue of far/extreme/right-wing politics is getting more and more popular among scholars and NGO's. Another finding that can be outlined is that university and research organization-affiliated scholars and authors pay less attention to already mentioned terminological ambiguity. Determining a particular party or movement as a radical or extreme right without any vivid or measurable criteria makes the issue more complicated and promotes lots of misunderstandings. Thus, one gets the impression that the status of a particular party or movement is predetermined from the very beginning without any scientific background. Therefore, we cannot argue that academic literature on the Georgian language is based on either German or Anglo-Saxon experience, however, Mudde's typology is the most commonly used, that can be probably explained by the fact that Mudde is the most cited author in the academic issue of far/radical/extreme right-wing.

Hence, we can conclude that the article collects Georgian academic bibliography on this issue and it can be used for two major purposes. Firstly, the discussed papers can be used by another interested author who wants to study far/radical/extreme rightswing issues in Georgia and generally. Secondly, using the experience of the paper,the authors from East Europe may try to analyze their national academics' perceptions on these concepts and then compare different cases.

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Abstract: Unlike some European countries, the involvement of radical right-wing forces in Georgian politics and the support of a certain part of the society for them is a relatively new phenomenon in Georgia's politics. This has resulted in a growing interest in the study of the topic among Georgian academic circles. However, the defining and applying the concepts of radicalism and extremism regarding Georgian right-wing forces are different. By comparing the major approaches to the concepts of right-wing radicalism and extremism this paper aims to critically review and analyze perceptions from Georgian academia.

Keywords: Georgia, far-right, radical right, Euroscepticism, Georgian academia