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Ukrainian nationalism and Viktor Polishchuk as its historian

Introduction

Ukrainian nationalism as a doctrine and ideology is a subject relatively unknown to historians and political scientists both in Europe and the USA. This applies all the more to its genocidal activity against the Polish and Jewish populations during the World War II, marked by exceptionally barbaric methods reminiscent of the extermination practices used in the Middle Ages by the victors against their conquered opponents. This political direction was not dealt with in depth and detail for a long time. This was due to a number of reasons, not so much scientific as political. By accepting or even unequivocally supporting the newly created Ukrainian state after the dissolution of the USSR, whose existence became an oppositional factor in relation to the new Russia and its imperialist advances, the essential features of the Ukrainian nationalist movement were reluctantly reported, which, due to the lack of other national traditions, began to function as a factor in Ukraine, integrating the already strongly Russified society of the new state. The propaganda activity of the Ukrainian expatriate community, consisting largely of former nationalists, their supporters and generations of descendants, also played a significant role here. Therefore, the topic of Ukrainian nationalism and its practical activity is worth exploring further. One of the most distinguished researchers in this field was the recently deceased Assistant Professor Viktor Polishchuk, a person declaring his affiliation with the Ukrainian nationality of the democratic provenience, outspoken against all chauvinism and totalitarianism.

Academic activity of Professor Viktor Polishchuk

Polishchuk devoted a dozen academic and journalistic works to the problem of Ukrainian nationalism and the effects of its activity, he also wrote many articles, critical analyses, reviews and press publications. The books are: *Gorzka prawda – cień Bandery nad zbrodnią ludobójstwa* [Bitter truth : the criminality of the Organization of Ukrainian

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Nationalists (OUN) and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA)], published in three languages: Polish, Ukrainian and English; *Ideologia nacjonalizmu ukraińskiego* [The Ideology of Ukrainian Nationalism], his doctoral dissertation, *Apokalipsa według Wiktora Ukraińca* [Apocalypse according to Viktor the Ukrainian]; *Falszowanie historii najnowszej Ukrainy* [Falsifying the Recent History of Ukraine]; *Ocena polityczna i prawna OUN¹ i UPA* [Political and legal assessment of the OUN and the UPA]², also published in Polish, Ukrainian and English; *Akcja Wisła – próba oceny* [Operation Vistula – An Attempt at Evaluation]; *Zginęli z rąk ukraińskich* [They Died at the Hands of the Ukrainians]; *Pojęcie integralnego nacjonalizmu ukraińskiego* [The Concept of Integral Ukrainian Nationalism]; *Posłanie do braci Polaków* [A Message to Our Polish Brothers]; *Manowce polskich historyków* [How Polish Historians Got It Wrong]; *Ukraińskie ofiary OUN-UPA* [Ukrainian Victims of the OUN-UPA]; *1943: OUN Bandery na Wołyniu* [1943: Banderă's OUN in Volhynia]; *Ludobójstwo nagrodzone* [The Genocide Appraised]; *Gwałt na prawdzie o zbrodniach OUN Bandery* [The Violated Truth about the Crimes of Banderă's OUN]; and his *opus magnum*, a 2,579-page, five-volume work containing a reconstruction of the entire history and ideology of the OUN and UPA along with an extensive selection of documents, under the joint title *Integralny nacjonalizm ukraiński jako odmiana faszyzmu* [Integral Ukrainian Nationalism as a Kind of Fascism]. The first two volumes of the aforementioned work have separate titles corresponding to their content. They are: *Zasady ideologiczne nacjonalizmu ukraińskiego* [Ideological Principles of Ukrainian Nationalism], *Ukraiński ruch nacjonalistyczny – struktura organizacyjna i założenia programowe* [Ukrainian Nationalist Movement – Organizational Structure and Program Assumptions], and *Dowody zbrodni OUN i UPA* [Evidence of the Crimes of the OUN and UPA]. This volume is Polishchuk's habilitation thesis, reviewed by the author of this article. The third, fourth and fifth volumes were given the joint title: *Nacjonalizm ukraiński w dokumentach* [Ukrainian Nationalism in Documents]. Each of them was also given a separate title adequate to its content: *Dokumenty z zakresu zasad ideologicznych i założeń programowych nacjonalizmu ukraińskiego* [Documents on the ideological principles and programme assumptions of Ukrainian nationalism]; *Dokumenty z zakresu zasad ideologicznych i założeń programowych nacjonalizmu ukraińskiego w okresie od 1920 do grudnia 1943 roku* [Documents on the ideological principles and programme assumptions of Ukrainian nationalism in the period from 1920 to December 1943]; *Dokumenty z zakresu działań struktur nacjonalizmu ukraińskiego w okresie od grudnia 1943 do 1950 roku*; [Documents on the activities of the structures of Ukrainian nationalism in the period from December 1943 to 1950].

In addition to the scientific and journalistic books and other publications listed here, Polishchuk left us – as his last achievement – the Polish translation of the basic theoretical treatise of Ukrainian nationalism, i.e., *Nationalism* by Dmytro Dontsov, along with

¹ Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists.

² Ukrainian Insurgent Army.

an extensive commentary. I was honoured to write a preface to this book. The aim of the publication, in the intention of Polishchuk's and mine, was to expose Ukrainian nationalism in the eyes of Poles and others, as an ideology based on extreme social Darwinism, not unwilling to use genocide as one of its methods. Such an approach to the issue seemed purposeful to us, as various propaganda centers, both Ukrainian, Polish and other, as well as people generally unaware of the issues, often equate Polish and Ukrainian nationalism, which is a blatant misunderstanding and testifies to their ignorance or deliberate falsification of history in the interest of *ad hoc* political agendas. Polish nationalism, starting as early as in the 1920s, was based on the Catholic worldview, while the Ukrainian one diverged from the principles of Christian ethics.

Polishchuk's life story is of great importance. He was the only scholar to provide a complete picture of Ukrainian nationalism in his works in all its tenets, underlining its criminal nature. His *Integralny nacjonalizm ukraiński jako odmiana faszyzmu* concerns both the historical facts behind the movement, as well as the broadly understood ideology, taking into account its axiological foundations. The author applied modern methodology, and the image of the movement he depicts is truly multidimensional. He did not shy away from issues embedded in philosophy or sociology, ending up with an interdisciplinary study, in the full sense of the word, which is so rare in humanities. We should bear in mind that historians generally limit themselves to recording the sequence of events, failing to consider a lot of very important historical aspects of a nature that already falls within other scientific disciplines. Not surprisingly, Polish history methodologist Professor Jerzy Topolski, criticizing the "event approach" to history, advocated its "marriage" "with other disciplines".

Contrary to historians, political scientists are inclined to take into account a wider range of aspects of the problems under their scrutiny, but they also focus on issues of state and political power, leaving aside the axiological ones, which are sometimes as important in recognizing the essence and significance of various political movements. Such issues are taken up by the emerging subdiscipline of religious studies – the political science of religion. Polishchuk, as I stated when reviewing his scientific achievements for the purposes of his habilitation proceedings, took into account all those aspects in his works. As a researcher of Ukrainian nationalism, he took a deeply humanistic position. He was repulsed by the Darwinist ideology of the OUN. He professed humanistic patriotism, understood as an ideology in which the element of love precedes all others, leaving no room for negative feelings. Appreciating this type of commitment, he inevitably rejected other whose essence was the negation of other nationalities or human groups, especially when it led to their extermination. And this was the Ukrainian nationalism of the formation suggested by the OUN. Therefore, Polishchuk reacted to totalitarian communism and even more cruel Ukrainian nationalism with strong opposition, as expressed by specific acts in the field of science.

Polishchuk was an example of a Ukrainian whom we should deeply respect and wish there were more of. No wonder the Social Foundation for the Remembrance of the Polish Nation awarded him with the order of Polonia Mater Nostra Est.

The Ukrainian national option of Polishchuk's, as he admitted himself, was not always well received in Poland. On the other hand, the nationalist-minded Ukrainians in Canada, with whom he initially tried to cooperate, turned out to be unacceptable from his point of view. According to his memoirs, he was even threatened with the aggressiveness of such degree that he had to seek protection from the Canadian police. Polish historians in the country also looked down on him, especially those who, either for opportunist reasons or in good faith, accepted the vision of Polish-Ukrainian relations as promoted by Jerzy Giedroyc, the editor of the Polish émigré periodical published in Paris. The vision required silence about the crimes of the UPA and its political base of the OUN. And still Polishchuk adopted the exactly opposite attitude. To this day, I remember how Giedroyc, in a radio interview two weeks before his death, dismissed the problem of the UPA murders on Poles with his short: "one should forget" statement. He did not even bother to justify his attitude. It should be remembered that in the 1990s, the "Giedroyc's myth", as his views were described by other scientists, triumphed in the country, nearly wiping out all other interpretations of Polish-Ukrainian relations in recent history, which led not only to silence, but also outward hypocrisy. The Ukrainian side also denied committing the war crimes, as did the Turks with the issue of the annihilation of Armenians during the World War I!

Against the background of such a political landscape, Polishchuk's figure became inconvenient not only for Ukrainian nationalists, but also for many Poles and people adhering to the philosophy of 'non-irritating' the Ukrainian side, which, in their opinion, was to ensure friendly relations with it. Polishchuk's enemy was also the prevailing anti-Polonism, which recognized the principle that the mass genocide of around 200,000 Poles in the south-eastern borderlands of the Second Polish Republic was not worth scientific research and human memory, as only the Holocaust deserved the respect and interest of historians (Sierakowski, 2003).

With all his attitude, Polishchuk represented the type of Ukrainians who were free from nationalism. His writings also reveal a certain vision of new Polish-Ukrainian relations, bringing together the two nations, formerly bound by common history, and then separated by social antagonisms and the scheming of the invaders, hostile to the independence of both Poland and Ukraine. Polishchuk as a historian and humanist, rejecting extreme Ukrainian nationalism, revealed all manifestations of its crimes, including those committed against its own nation, as well as against people of other political or ideological orientations. This last action was deemed particularly offensive to the nationalists who remained in the shadow of the OUN and UPA traditions. Neglecting Polishchuk's scientific achievements should also be considered as a slap in the face of the Polish nation, its martyrdom and healthy national interest, which did not clash with

the principle of friendship with the Ukrainian nation, the lion's share of which in central and eastern Ukraine was never infected with the OUN's ideology. Polishchuk, often prevented from speaking and attacked in Poland, gives us an example of independent thought that tries to present phenomena as they are. His work warns us against various illusions that may lead to fatal consequences in the future, such as the illusions of politicians like the pre-war voivode of Volhynia, Henryk Józewski and his principals, leading to misfortune and bloodshed.

Polishchuk's only error in understanding Polish-Ukrainian relations in the first half of the 20th century was blaming all the causes of evil in this respect solely on the Ukrainian nationalism. As can be imagined, he did not acknowledge or was simply unaware of the events in Ukraine after the fall of the tsarist regime. At that time, when no theory of the Dontsovian type nationalism existed among the rural masses, cruel murders of Poles were taking place. The underlying cause was not nationalist doctrine, but class antagonisms and the barbaric primitivism of the local rural population. In the inter-war period, Zofia Kossak-Szczucka wrote about it in her novel *Pożoga* [Conflagration] and Maria Dunin-Kozicka in her memoirs entitled *Burza od wschodu* [Storm from the East]. These works were widely known in pre-war Poland and were reprinted after the fall of communism in 1989, serving now as documents compiled by first-hand witnesses of the era who personally experienced the tragic events. Polishchuk did not draw appropriate conclusions from such testimonies, blaming everything on the Darwinist doctrine of Ukrainian nationalism (Dontsov, 2008), which developed in the territories of the Second Polish Republic, and not in the later Soviet Ukraine, where the local Bolshevik totalitarianism would not allow any competitive ideology.

Ukrainian nationalism and Polish policy towards Ukraine and Ukrainians

The problem of Ukrainian nationalism under the banner of the OUN and the UPA made itself felt in an extremely tragic way in the 20th century and is still revived today. It did not die a natural death, as was the case with many other ideas and extreme movements of totalitarian nationalism, which triumphed in the first half of the last century. Ukrainian nationalism still functions, it is a living ideology in Ukraine, especially in the west, in exile, and also in Poland among the Ukrainian minority. Although this approach does not currently recruit many supporters into its ranks, its situation is special, and in the event of favourable circumstances, it may turn dangerous.

While in eastern and central Ukraine, Ukrainian nationalism does not enjoy great influence, in western Ukraine (the former territories of the Second Polish Republic) the case is different. It is there that the nationalists – as it turns out – are trying to 'revive' the nation that has been Sovietized for several decades and give it an active character. Ukrainians there are generally unfavourable towards Poles and Poland, with the nationalists being outright hostile. What is more, they deny historical facts, i.e., the genocide

committed by the UPA on Poles living in the south-eastern borderlands of the Second Polish Republic. Evidence of such attitudes can be found in various writings of the followers of this political orientation, the slogans put forward there, and in many events with a clearly anti-Polish message, news of which has increased more and more in recent times.

What Ukrainian nationalism is and what it means for contemporary Ukraine, is described by a person of Belarusian nationality, a sociologist Professor Włodzimierz Pawluczuk:

[...] there would be no independent Ukraine, there would have been no history of the Ukrainian nation as a political nation fighting for full independence, if it had not been for nationalists [...], if it had not been for the national fanaticism of individuals obsessed with the mad idea of creating a brave, historically significant nation from the amorphous 'Ruthenian' mass. Ukraine's fate would have been similar to that of Belarus. If the ideological content and the activities of nationalists, including the UPA in particular, are deleted from the history of Ukraine, the culture and history of Ukraine do not contain any substance that would give it a chance to legitimize the country's full independence. The nineteenth-century Ukrainian patriots [...] said nothing about independent Ukraine and, what is more, did not even think about it. Even Hrushevsky and Vynnyshenko, the leaders of the Central Council of Ukraine in 1917, did not think about it, calling only for the autonomy of Ukraine within Russia (Pawluczuk, 1998: 78).

From the point of view of the Polish *raison d'état*, pro-Russian Ukraine is not a good option. This may result in the absorption of the country by Russia, strengthening its imperialist tendencies with even more potential. We already have a foretaste of this in the form of the so-called Donetsk and Lugansk republics. They are the disaster of Polish policy towards Ukraine and the contradiction between the two already historic trends in Polish political thought, i.e., National Democracy (ND) and the Marshal Józef Piłsudski's camp, regarding our south-eastern neighbours, and the other development of the possible situation is definitely not good for us, either, i.e., Ukraine organized by Ukrainian chauvinist nationalism, gaining an advantage over the Dnieper in the country and becoming a determinant of its identity. Such a solution was advocated in 1926 by the ideologist of Ukrainian nationalism Dmytro Dontsov in his book titled *Nacjonalizm* [Nationalism] constituting the codification of this doctrine. This work continues to be an important ideological inspiration for Ukrainian nationalists.

The principles of the ideology of Ukrainian nationalism – as presented by Dontsov – were adopted by the OUN, founded in 1929, and then by its militia – the UPA. They were close to Nazism and fascist in nature.

At this point, a question should be asked about the relationship between the OUN ideology and the Christian religion and the Uniate Church. Nationalisms can be classified in various ways. From the point of view of their impact, however, and thus, the threats they pose, the essence of their character is best reflected in their attitude to religious values. Integral Ukrainian nationalism under the OUN's banner was (and still is) an areligious nationalism, in contrast to its contemporary: the nationalism of the Na-

tionalist Democratic Party, whose slogan in the 1930s advocated the construction of the “Catholic State of the Polish Nation”, which equalled the declaration of the necessity to subordinate “national ethics” to Catholic ethics (Poradowski, 1997).

Returning to the two above-mentioned currents of Polish political thought, i.e., the ND’s and Piłsudski’s, competing with each other in terms of ideas to defend Poland against communism and which, in some highly processed forms, still function in Poland, it should be remembered that Marshal Piłsudski was convinced of the need to free Ukraine from the influence of white or red Russia, considering it an indispensable condition for securing Poland against Russian imperialism. The latter goal was to be served by the creation of a group of states situated between Germany and Russia, the combined potential of which could guarantee an effective defence against their possessiveness. The result of such reasoning was, *inter alia*, Piłsudski’s treaty with the leader of the Ukrainian People’s Republic, Symon Petliura, and the so-called Kiev expedition in 1920 to support the newly established, but already declining Ukrainian statehood in the form of the Ukrainian People’s Republic. The ND, on the other hand, faced the same political problems at that time and later, and expressed the view that Ukrainians were only an amorphous ethnographic mass that could not be a serious political partner. This statement was supported by the fact that after the collapse of the tsarist regime during the revolution in Russia, the idea of an independent Ukraine did not receive sufficient support from Ukrainians themselves, who failed to create an army adequate to the needs of the time and did not support the authorities of the URL sufficiently. National Democrats also feared that independent Ukraine could become a bridgehead of Germany in eastern Europe, which could also encircle Poland from the east. They also considered the fact that the Polish-Ukrainian (Ruthenian) conflict in eastern Galicia had been growing for several decades now, as a result of the awakening of the national consciousness of the local Ruthenians, increasingly reluctant to Poles and Polishness. In the period of the struggle for the borders of the reborn Republic of Poland, National Democrats were of the opinion that in the east, the part of the former Eastern Borderlands that could be Polonized in the future should be incorporated into the newly rebuilt Polish state. They believed that it would be possible to separate the Ruthenian masses from Ukrainian nationalism, referring to the times when the Ruthenians fell for community with Poles, a synonym of which was a specific identity option occurring in old Poland, expressed in the words “*gente Ruthenus, natione Polonus*”.

However, the policy towards national minorities in the Second Polish Republic was not consistent. Various elements from the two above-mentioned schools of political thought were mixed within it. Following the Sanation rise to power in 1926, Piłsudski’s old policy was continued, although under changed conditions. Generally speaking, Piłsudski saw allies in Ukrainians who, given a different balance of power, could stand a chance to contribute to the breakup of the USSR. The entire ‘Promethean’ campaign, supporting separatist tendencies in communist Russia, served that purpose. Thus, Ukrainians

in Poland could not be treated in accordance with the concept that, in relation to national minorities, is generally represented by the nationalism of the dominant nation in the state. It is, therefore, a great misconception bred by propaganda in the past period of the belief that national minorities in the Second Polish Republic were greatly oppressed. Poland was not a totalitarian state and despite certain limitations of democracy, it did leave a significant margin of freedom to national minorities. It should be remembered that it is totalitarianism, in accordance with its essence, that breaks down all natural social ties, liquidating social corporations and the autonomy of the human individual itself, forcing it into the mould of the 'only right' ideological and political system. Due to the methods applied, totalitarianism is able to destroy not only all social ties, but also entire nations – depriving them of their elites, and then, also their own identity, and thus, of language, culture and even religion – leading them to the state of a shapeless ethnographic mass. In the case of Soviet communism, such a process is usually called Sovietization. Communist totalitarianism also adopted the methods of genocide, ethnic cleansing, deliberately inflicted hunger, as was the case in the 1930s in the Soviet Ukraine, and the disorganized communities in this way Russified much more effectively than tsarist regime.

The Republic of Poland left a large margin of manoeuvre to Ukrainians. There were Ukrainian parties, Ukrainian MPs sat in the Sejm, and senators in the Senate. There were also Ukrainian education, press, scouting, and various economic and cultural institutions. Especially in Volhynia, the local voivode, Józewski, supported by Piłsudski, carried out his 'experiment', as a result of which the voivodeship was to become the Ukrainian Piedmont. In fact, such a policy did not meet the expectations of its animators and the Ukrainians themselves. Sanation's Poland, abandoning the programme suggested by ND in relation to the Ukrainian minority, turned out to be too weak to enforce its demands. At the same time, it allowed the sprouting of extreme nationalism among Ukrainians in the south-eastern Borderlands, whose storm column became the radically destructive organization of Ukrainian Nationalists in relation to the Second Polish Republic, which used terror before 1939 (the murder of Minister Bronisław Pieracki, a supporter of an agreement with the Ukrainians, and Tadeusz Hołówka, a politician of likewise views) and sabotage, simultaneously collaborating with the Third Reich (Kulińska, 2009). With time, however, the OUN and Dontsov's ideology had won an increasing number of souls among the Ukrainian minority, which resulted in the genocide of Poles and Jews during the World War II.

After Piłsudski's death, the voivode Józewski, arousing more and more resistance among Poles, was dismissed from Volhynia, and the policy towards Ukrainians changed, as it was believed, to be more adequate to the existing realities. However, these were the last years before the war (Grott, 2013)

The tragedy, which was the brutal murder of thousands of Poles from the Eastern Borderlands during World War II by Ukrainian nationalists, has already been described

quite well. Strict calculations were made, which leave us no doubt. However, there are circles that constantly perpetuate lies on this subject and try to cover up the scale of the atrocities committed by the OUN and the UPA, acting from base motives or for mis-conceived political reasons.

After the collapse of the USSR and the emergence of the Ukrainian state on the European map, old problems related to Polish-Ukrainian and – indirectly – Polish-Russian relations appeared to have been revived. Old concepts, though tailored to the already new conditions, are back. The current Polish foreign policy in its most important aspects seems to constitute a continuum of the kind that Piłsudski preferred. Its essence is to counteract the subjugation of Ukraine to Russia, with the latter returning to its imperial traditions. The memory of the UPA crimes becomes inconvenient in the eyes of various Polish politicians, and the Ukrainian side, to put it mildly, behaves in an arrogant and even brutal way regarding these issues, perpetrating various lies and demonstrating various gestures of hatred.

Bandera's tradition³ is becoming, at least in western Ukraine, one of the most important components of the new Ukrainian consciousness. Monuments and statues of the attested UPA crowd killers multiply and streets are named after them. It is all taking place in complete disregard for Polish-Ukrainian relations and the officially proclaimed necessity of Poland's cooperation with Ukraine.

It is also certain that Ukraine, organized in the spirit of Ukrainian nationalism, can be a very dangerous neighbour. To forget – as Giedroyc advised – or to remain silent equals giving up on one's own rights and, psychologically speaking, does not always alleviate disputes, and more often opens up an escalation of the opposing party's demands. Following this path by Poland may misfire, as the principles and traditions of the OUN are still accepted by some Ukrainians, and so far, a truly democratic formation is lacking in this society. The influences of the nationalist ideology are most visible in the western areas of the Ukrainian state, i.e., in the vicinity of Poland.

Nowadays, it is generally believed that the era of belligerent, chauvinistic nationalisms is over, and the experiences of the last world war created a sufficient climate for ideas related to the principles of tolerance and respect for the human being. It is not known, however, to what extent this rule can apply today in territories where democracy has never existed before, and hence also in Ukraine, where the former tsarist self-tenure was replaced by totalitarian communist collectivism, which did not retreat from mass crimes. The latter system, in place for several decades, has shaped the social mentality and the features bred by it still persist. It is, therefore, possible that in the next period, according to the speculations of researchers such as Polishchuk and Pawluczuk, extreme Ukrainian nationalism will turn out to be the most adequate ideology for the society of this country and fill the void left by communism, while threatening Polish in-

³ The name comes from the name of Bandera, the leader of one of the OUN factions.

terests and even today's Polish-Ukrainian border (Grott, Grott, 2016: 42). It should also be remembered that this nationalism postulates the creation of great Ukraine in the future, stretching from the San River to the Caucasus Mountains and the Volga. The territory of such a state would cover approximately one million square kilometres (Polishchuk, 2003: 154). To sum up, it must be assumed that such a creation would be conflict-prone from the perspective of Poland and other Ukrainian neighbours. As a state, Ukraine would be enough, not reaching further east and south than the border of the First Polish Republic until the Khmelnytsky Uprising in 1648 and inhabited by no more than 25 million people.

Polish nationalism and Ukrainian nationalism in the context of other European nationalisms

As commonly known, Ukrainian nationalism under the OUN-UPA banner recorded itself with bloody letters in the recent history of the Polish nation. Its victims were also Jews and Ukrainians of other political orientations, as well as representatives of other nationalities. The scale of the crimes committed motivates us to undertake efforts to explain its essence and define the features that distinguish it from other nationalisms. For us, it is particularly interesting to compare Ukrainian nationalism, which developed in the interwar period and during the occupation in the south-eastern borderlands of the Second Polish Republic, with contemporary Polish nationalism, also functioning within the same territories, and other European nationalisms. The result of such a comparison should be the demonstration of the existing differences and the underlying values that shaped the Ukrainian nationalist formation on the one hand, and Polish and other nationalisms on the other. The issue is very important and still relevant, which is also reflected in current politics. Moreover, as already emphasized at the beginning, the awareness of the genre quality of the OUN-UPA nationalism in contemporary Poland and in Europe is low, which necessitates extensive supplementing, including the field of common knowledge on this subject. It is also worth remembering that few researchers deal with the problems of nationalist doctrines, and even fewer are aware of the difference between Polish nationalism and other ones accepting Catholic values from Ukrainian nationalism. Historians, as we wrote above, generally pay attention to organizational forms and related persons and events. Political scientists mainly deal with power systems, also leaving axiological issues aside. Both the former, as well as the latter, lack the sufficient understanding of nationalist doctrines, although the latter are often the core of a given episode of history. So let us now examine this issue using the best comparative method in this case.

In its initial phase, at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries, Polish nationalism was influenced by the spirit of positivism. Stanisław Kozicki, a historian and activist of the National League, and then later party organizations of the National Democratic Party,

described the worldview profile of his ideologues and the nature of the thought they created: “They never put forward the method by which they started learning about the laws governing human life and society, but their writings testify that they were empiricists, in line with the times, as educators of the positivist period in Poland. It was in line with Comte’s maxim – to know to foresee the purpose of remedy” (Kozicki, 1964: 438-439).

The reading list of the NDs of the time presented by Kozicki did not include works of Roman Catholic origin, but was limited to items quite typical of the positivist era (Kozicki, 1964: 205). The ND ideology was also independent of the Church concepts. Extreme liberalism was quite unfavourable in those circles. This is well illustrated by the statement by Zygmunt Balicki, one of the main ideologists of the ND, on the subject. He stated that “wherever absolute liberalism gains a firm and permanent advantage, there comes the gradual dissolution of the nation, its type and its individuality” (Grott, 1995: 5). It was said primarily about endangered nations, and Poles at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries, after more than a hundred years of captivity, were among such. The ND’s ideologists of this period sometimes looked with a critical eye on the policy of the Catholic Church in Poland, but believed it to be an anchor of Polishness. Jan Ludwik Popławski even stated that breaking with the Church would amount to national suicide (Popławski, 1897: 7).

It should also be emphasized that the then ND doctrine did not reveal any properties that might have been considered as manifestations of chauvinism and was defensive in nature. Although it was familiar with the social theories typical of the late 19th century, with the philosophy of Herbert Spencer at the forefront, no extreme conclusions were drawn from them. This doctrine easily fit within the standards of civilized Europe. It also approved parliamentarism with the model of the rule of law and the principle of respect for the human being. The ND, becoming more and more entrenched in Polish society, had to adopt its doctrine to the prevailing worldview profile. As Roman Dmowski, the main leader of this political formation, wrote, the original character of the ideology of *Przegląd Wszepolski* did not gain understanding in the ranks of the numerically growing National Democratic Party. The “positivist” elements were gradually reduced and the “process of fusing nationalism with Catholicism into a single ideological whole” began (Grott, 1984a; 2015). Moreover, the interwar period was characterized by a certain revival of the religiosity of Polish intelligentsia (Grott, 1991: 20-26). The development of social Catholicism at that time was also of great importance, as expressed, *inter alia*, in the second most important social encyclical *Quadragesimo anno*, promulgated by Pius XI in 1931. It became a great impulse for the development of the social, and in part the political, Catholic thought propagated by numerous circles, including the National Democratic Party. It should be remembered that many activists of this political milieu were involved in the Catholic Action at the time, taking an active part in its organizational life. In the 1930s, a clear flow of both ideas and people between Catholic environments and organizations and nationalist organizations can be

observed. The motivation to embrace Catholic ideas widely by Polish nationalism was the well-known and regularly reissued booklet by Dmowski from 1927 – *Kościół, Naród i Państwo* [The Church, the Nation and the State]. The leader of the ND wrote there: “Catholicism is not an addition to Polishness, giving it a certain flavour, it is the very part of its essence” (Dmowski, 1927: 13). Dmowski tried to present nationalism as a defensive reaction of Catholic nations that had been distanced by Protestant nations (Dmowski, 1927:13). In those years, atheistic communist totalism was threatening from the East, and neo-pagan movements were developing in Germany and Nazism, also inspired by them (Grott, Grott, 2018: 73-186). Polish nationalism, whose main expression was the ND and the national-radical current separated from it in 1934, more and more willingly drew not only from the current teaching of the Church, but also turned to the philosophy of Saint Thomas Aquinas (Malatyński, 1935). This is evidenced by numerous texts published as separate books, brochures and articles. Later, Adam Doboszyński, sentenced to death by the communists, an ideologist and one of the leading leaders of the generation of ‘young’ National Democrats and author of the book reissued three times *Gospodarka narodowa* [The National Economy], stated that he is writing this work for those who want to rebuild the world in accordance with the principles of Christianity, based on the thoughts of Saint Thomas Aquinas (Doboszyński, 1934: 7). Indeed, the latter is often quoted in *Gospodarka narodowa*. Doboszyński’s later work on the political system was also entitled *Regimen commixtum*, borrowed from Thomas’ considerations concerning the state.

Thus, Catholic values left their mark on all sectors of the broad system of the ND doctrine, and – to a greater or lesser extent – on national-radical doctrines (Grott, 1987). This meant opting for completely different values than those represented by extreme nationalisms, i.e., those chauvinistic ones, often associated with racism.

Even before the publication of Dmowski’s leaflet *Kościół, Naród i Państwo*, i.e., in 1925, the Ideological Declaration of the All-Polish Youth – an organization that constituted the youth extension of the National Democratic Party – reformulated its view on the value of the nation. Consequently, the nation was then deprived of its absolute position. The fragment of the A-PY Declaration of 1922, in which the nation was considered an absolute, was replaced with: “Religious beliefs and feelings are an important source of the society’s moral strength and a guarantee of its high ethical standing. The Catholic Church, as the religion of the vast majority of the Polish nation, should occupy a leading position in its religious life” (Turowski, 1937: 9). It was a very important doctrinal change on the way to the formation of “Christian nationalism” in Poland (Vausard, Puzynianka, Peretiatkowicz, 1927: 146; Giertych, 1948), which had been represented from the 1920s by the ND, and then by its national-radical secessionist groups.

By following the paths of development of the doctrines created within these political circles, we can clearly see that the concepts of the nation advocated there were fundamentally different from the Ukrainian ones, as found in Dontsov’s writings. As al-

ready noted, the nation lost its absolute position among Polish nationalists, which, from now on, was to be attributed to God only. Catholic ethics was also to apply at all levels of life, both between individuals and nations, and between an individual and a nation and humanity. The nation was often referred to as a kind of extended family, and hence the link between family and humanity. A special bond with it was to be regulated by the Catholic principle of “gradation of love for one’s neighbour”, according to which a human being deserves more from people and groups closer to him than others – who are further away. The relevant ideological formulations often emphasized the equality of all historical nations and did not call for any aggression. At that time, it was difficult to find any rhetoric specific to social Darwinism in the ideological statements of the National Democratic Party. There was also a cultural conception of the nation, which – in practice – did not show the kind of national exclusivism that we encounter within chauvinistic nationalisms, generally associated with racism (Grott, 1984b: 35-54). In Poland, racism was rejected as a materialistic concept, contrary to Christian spiritualism (Grott, 1984a: 119-139).

The significant influence of Catholic values was also seen in the concept of the political system. In the 1930s, all factions of Polish nationalism of the ND provenance denied liberalism, as well as totalitarianism, which was tantamount to statolatry condemned by the Church. The most radical Falanga, admittedly put forward the concept of “Catholic totalism”, which would guarantee that the state would not interfere in the affairs of the Church, religion and family. Such a restriction was to ensure the acceptance of the project by the Church. It was so, because the church rejected only full totalism called “objective”, as well as, consistent liberalism. The other, middle ground concepts of the state system were acceptable in the Church .

The concept of the state, as suggested by Polish nationalism, evolved towards a religious state. At the end of the 1930s, the idea of the Catholic State of the Polish Nation emerged, taking on various shades within the circle of the National Party (NP) and national-radical factions. The above-mentioned concept of “Catholic totalism” was interpreted differently within Falanga. This is because it was concerned with the totalism of the state. Due to the advocacy of Catholicism as the obligatory worldview, the group assumed that “Catholic totalism” would be understood as state totalism yet limited. State power could, thus, begin at the threshold of the Church and the family home only. In this concept, the state acted as the secular arm of the Church. The need to fight atheistic communism and the neo-paganism threatening from Germany was emphasized (Grott, Grott, 2018: 121,186). Poland was again proclaimed the bulwark of Christianity (Grott, 1991: 103-150, 239-260).

Economic concepts, as noted above, were also subordinated to Catholic ideals. Only in Falanga were other solutions put forward as well, including a planned economy.

The stigma of Catholic values was also strongly evident in the historiosophic thought. The history of the NP and Obóz Narodowo-Radykalny ABC (ONR-ABC) ideologues

dealing with this issue was treated as a process of the Church's struggle with the "subversive" forces (Gluziński, 1927), thought to have originated from the depths of the Middle Ages. Generally, the era of the Christian Middle Ages was assessed most positively, as it was then that religion fully permeated life and culture. A peculiar kind of medievalism, along with a growing attention to Thomist philosophy, became a special feature of almost all concepts appearing in the broadly understood national camp. The most criticized was the so-called ideology of the French Revolution along with the entire Enlightenment, and the 19th century as a field for implementing the values of the latter epoch (Grott, 1991: 201-221).

The correlation of views of nationalist and national-radical nationalism with Catholicism became more and more visible. In the interwar period, a Dominican and simultaneously a Thomist philosopher Father Józef M. Bocheński was a significant figure. It is worth taking a closer look at his thoughts, which in the relevant passages constitute what can be called the ideal model of Christian nationalism. Bocheński's thought very clearly reflects the possible connections between Catholicism and nationalism and shows how the national feeling can be supported with a religious element. Father Bocheński repeatedly spoke at the invitation of nationalist activists as a critic of the concepts they were putting forward. He would then adjudicate on their compliance with the teaching of the Church. So, he was a respected and authoritative person. Although he did not engage in politics, his views reflect the main direction of the evolution of the thoughts of the national camp in Poland. This direction led to fundamentalism of some kind.

What were nation and nationalism to Bocheński? How much did his views on the subject differ from those of chauvinist nationalists?

According to Bocheński: "a nation has a moral *raison d'être* only insofar as it aims to cultivate, deepen and develop superhuman values. It is precisely this goal that is the objective and universalist justification of nationalism, giving a Catholic [...] the duty to be a nationalist; the culture of humanity in the Catholic concept is the harmony of national cultures, serving individual, national cultures is a service to culture written in capital C" (Bocheński, 1994: 39).

By the term nation, Bocheński understands a community with a common positive attitude towards certain cultural values. For him, the only determinant in this area is culture, not the origin or the race as such. So, we are dealing here with a cultural conception of the nation. The blood community is irrelevant. Pursuing the same values means having a common goal. The goal is, therefore, to unite and define the national community. The goal is of Catholic and universalistic nature. 'Particular ideals' are not important and cannot, according to Bocheński, support nationalism. In this way, he and theorists like him solve the problem in order to give the nation a proper rank in the consciousness of the religious man.

According to Bocheński, Catholicism as a universalist religion should embrace all people as it does not differentiate between them in terms of their final destiny, it has the

same dogmatic content for all, constitutes a uniform organization all over the world, and administers generally the same sacraments.

Bocheński emphasizes, however, that Catholicism is not universalistic when it comes to all sorts of secondary matters. There may be some differences in the interpretation of dogma, of course within the framework permitted by the Church, differences in external religious customs or even liturgy, differences in the ethical type, the same way of reacting to even supernatural values, differences in the type of religious feelings, in religious art, etc.

These differences underlie the various national cultures which must fulfil various missions in the history of Catholicism and in the service of it. In this way, the nation is justified, with its identity and distinctiveness from others. It is not a value in itself, but in relation to religion and its functioning. The plurality of different nations is also sanctioned. The tendencies to cultivate one's own national values, characteristic of nationalism, as long as they are correlated with the spirit of universalism, gain a deepened foundation in Catholicism and, of course, a religious sanction. However, the destruction of nations by others is unacceptable here. Nationalism demanding rights for its own people should respect others. Thus, the Darwinist vision of the world practiced in the bosom of extreme, i.e., chauvinistic nationalisms, becomes unacceptable. The latter included Ukrainian nationalism, represented by the OUN.

Coming back to the concept of the nation, it should be emphasized that the spiritual factor is so far in the foreground that the essence of ethnic ties based on a common language and origin is undermined, and since the nation is to be based only on common values, the logic of such reasoning requires Bocheński to exclude from the national community those who speak the same language and describe themselves, for example, as Poles, but are communists and materialists or extreme liberals. Bocheński equates universalism, which he advocates, with the only true universal culture (i.e., Christian), the varieties of which are national (also Christian) cultures. Therefore, only representatives of the Christian culture belong to the nation. Bocheński says:

At the moment [in the Second Polish Republic] apart from rare cases, all Poles admit to nationalism; both those who call themselves 'nationalists' and those who, by proclaiming a foreign and social policy program different from the "national" program, etc., recognize the good of the nation as the main goal of the action. [...] Only a few individuals seduced by the glitter of international slogans are left out, i.e., communists and certain liberalizing groups (Bocheński, 1994: 16,17).

There is, of course, the question of broadly understood nationalism, correlated with Christian principles. Although other types of it existed in Poland, their importance was negligible. They practically did not matter in political life. As can be seen, nationalism firmly rooted in the soil of religious values could be positively received by society as an authentic consequence of its culture and the underlying system of values professed by the overwhelming majority.

Having outlined the most important properties of Polish nationalism, it should be stated once again that it was strongly subordinated to Catholic standards. It was moderate in nature, essentially in line with personalism. It can, therefore, be characterized by the contemporary definition of “moderate nationalism” as developed by Reverend Stanisław Kowalczyk, who writes: “positive nationalism, i.e., moderate and ethically unquestioned, denotes pride in one’s national origin, love of the homeland, respect for its history, development of the national culture, etc. This is how nationalism may connect with Christian love of one’s neighbour” (Tarasiewicz, 2003: 244). Now let us move on to the doctrine of Ukrainian nationalism in order to contrast it with Polish nationalism and show the distinctiveness of the latter from the former. On the other hand, the full picture of Ukrainian ideology can be found in the book by Polishchuk entitled *Ideologia ukraińskiego nacjonalizmu* [The Ideology of Ukrainian Nationalism]. In terms of content, this ideology was far less sophisticated than its contemporary Polish nationalism, as well as many other European nationalisms. It did not take up a wide range of problems, which can be seen, for example, in the ideas of the National Democratic Party. Nevertheless, the existing differences are easy to capture. Ukrainian nationalism, as perceived by its main ideologist, Dontsov, was based on the foundation of social Darwinism.

Evaluations of Ukrainian nationalism by the Greek Catholic bishop Grzegorz Khomyshyn

It is obvious that such an understanding of the principles governing social life is contrary to the Christian worldview. Appealing to them and to various thinkers, such as Friedrich Nietzsche, Herbert Spencer, Gustav Ratzenhofer, Jerzy Sorel, Arthur Schopenhauer or Vilfred Pareto and other less important ones, placed a given doctrine among extreme nationalisms. It is true that the Ukrainian doctrine did not attack the Churches or their teachings, but in axiological terms it was alien to them. Ukrainian nationalism tried to exploit the Greek Catholic Church for its political purposes. One of his bishops, Grzegorz Khomyshyn, understood this. He expressed his views on this subject in the work *Problem ukraiński* [The Ukrainian Problem] (Khomyshyn, 1933).

Ukrainian nationalism, developing within the platform of the OUN and inspired by Dontsov’s thought, became, as already emphasized, close to Nazism and Italian fascism. Naturally, it also had its peculiar characteristics. It certainly belongs to the category named “dynamic fascism” by the English historian Hugh Trevor-Roper (Trevor-Roper, 1979: 418). It was a type of the extreme, i.e., chauvinistic, nationalism. This is evidenced by both its doctrine and atrocious deeds. It was fundamentally different not only from contemporary Polish nationalism, as well as many others, which at that time took into account at least the basic postulates of the Church, such as Portuguese Salazarism, French Action, or the united formations led by General Franco in the fight against the left-winged Spanish republic (Wielomski, 2006). It lacked, however, the neopagan elements so widespread in Germany. So, it did not attack the churches and did

not openly deny Christian dogmas and the existence of God. On the contrary, it spoke critically about Christian moral teaching (Stryjek, 2000: 179). Dontsov treated religion instrumentally as a factor strengthening national consciousness. This was due to the situation in Ukraine (Stryjek, 2000: 179). Later on, he somewhat adjusted his attitude. Tomasz Stryjek, the researcher of Dontsov's legacy, attributes the greatest influence on his thought to Nietzsche. The similarity of the positions of the Ukrainian ideologist and the German philosopher is clearly visible in *Nacjonalizm*, Dontsov's main work (Stryjek, 2000: 183). It should, however, be remembered that the lack of neo-pagan elements did not guarantee an even more moderate form of nationalism. Consistent social Darwinism was enough for a given nationalism to become integral nationalism, i.e. one that the nation recognizes as the highest value, not subject to any ethical restrictions (Stryjek, 2000: 189).

The above-mentioned Greek Catholic, Ukrainian bishop Khomyshyn, writing about the contemporary nationalism of his countrymen, called it "insane" (Khomyshyn, 1933: 27), "poisoned" (Khomyshyn, 1933: 28), "perverted" (Khomyshyn, 1933: 10) or "destructive" (Khomyshyn, 1933: 4) and contrasted it with "positive nationalism" (Khomyshyn, 1933: 3). In the chapter entitled *Nacjonalizm pozytywny jako cnota* [Positive nationalism as a virtue], he wrote: "We are commanded by our natural law to love our nation. When this love comes from supernatural faith and the love of God, then it is a virtue and a virtue supernatural [...]. To love your people in this way means to love as God commands it, that God's will is in this, that God's liking is in this, and finally, through this love, God's love is, thus, manifested and carried out" (Khomyshyn, 1933: 3).

Khomyshyn contrasts such "positive nationalism" with another nationalism,

which considers the nation to be the supreme sovereign, dethrones the absolute authority of God, contradicts the steadfast principles of the revealed supernatural faith, replacing them with its own, invented, misleading slogans, considers them dogmas and destroys not only the love of God, but also of the neighbour, as it introduces the fever of chauvinism and hatred towards all those who do not submit to such nationalism. This nationalism should be considered the greatest aberration of the human mind (Khomyshyn, 1933: 4).

There is no doubt that Khomyshyn is writing here about the nationalism whose banner was the Dontsov's doctrine. The bishop quoted even sees anti-Christian elements in the first animators of the Ukrainian national idea. Within its ranks, he lists Taras Shevchenko, Michał Dragomanov and Ivan Franko (Khomyshyn, 1933: 7-8).

Writing about contemporary Ukrainian nationalism, Khomyshin emphasizes that

this defective, poisoned and harmful nationalism has become a new religion in our country, just like materialism among Bolsheviks [...]. The matters of faith, Church and religion are irrelevant at all, or they have receded for the grace still tolerated by tradition or custom. Everything national is considered sacred, precious and indispensable, and matters of faith, church and religion are considered superfluous, unproductive and backward. Hence this strangeness, rude, and even hostile attitude [...] to everything that implies a religious spirit (Khomyshyn, 1933: 9).

Khomyshyn devoted a lot of space to the actual relationship between the ideology and activity of contemporary Ukrainian nationalism and religion and the Greek Orthodox Church, pointing to its being permeated by non-Christian values and slogans with a tendency to their ever-greater domination. This is the opposite direction of development to what was then taking place within the circles of Polish nationalism proclaiming the need to build a Catholic State of the Polish Nation.

Khomyshyn wrote:

our national institutions, or whatever we do, almost never originate with the principles of faith and religion. At first, they do not act against the Church and even emphasize their 'favour and kindness' towards it, because they need 'priests' in order to help and canvass on their behalf. However, these institutions, as well as other symptoms of national life, were and are but chrysalises, from which the killer slogans and destructive currents are hatched that threaten to destroy the entire nation (Khomyshyn, 1933: 9-10).

The title and content of one of the chapters of Khomyshyn's work quoted here are very clear: *Obłądny nacjonalizm prowadzi do pogańskiego światopoglądu...* [Insane nationalism leads to the pagan worldview] (Khomyshyn, 1933: 22). The bishop states there that "among us [i.e., Ukrainians] nationalism began to assume the features of a pagan spirit, as it introduces a pagan ethic of hatred, ordering to hate everyone who is of a different nationality" (Khomyshyn, 1933: 22). According to Khomyshyn, the reason for such a state of affairs is the state of the Ukrainian intelligentsia in the territory of the Second Polish Republic. The bishop described this intelligentsia as either liberal, radical or atheistic (Khomyshyn, 1933: 29). He wrote about the rest of Ukrainian society in Eastern Lesser Poland as "Catholics by name, superficial, etc." (Khomyshyn, 1933: 29). He also considered the condition of the Greek Catholic clergy to be very important for the matters discussed in his book. It contributed to the development of Ukrainian nationalism, without an attempt at negation of the ideas which, in fact, are contrary to the spirit of the Christian religion. Khomyshyn devoted a significant part of his book to the defective formation of the clergy. "Instead of [...] preventing evil," he wrote, it "has created an atmosphere within which evil increases and strengthens [...]. For this reason, the curse of Jesus Christ will fall upon the clergy for not being aware of the situation and not preventing the danger that they did not discern the poisoning of our nationalism at their roots" (Khomyshyn, 1933: 14).

The bishop's assessments are very unambiguous and categorical. They seem to explain well at least some of the reasons that made the doctrines of Polish nationalism and Ukrainian nationalism so different in the interwar years. Therefore, not content with all the above quotes, we again give the floor to Bishop Khomyshyn:

Ours as a whole, however of the [Ukrainian] clergy, whose task was to direct the current of the nationalist movement into the correct bed, and remove everything that is negative, harmful and dangerous in that flow, not only did it fail to fulfil this high and indispensable task, but on the contrary, it went with the unhealthy current and became the blind leader of the blind. No-

body will deny that the general [Ukrainian] clergy is indifferent to the life issues of the Church, or even partially alien to them, and does not feel close to the Church. Nevertheless, its zeal for national affairs is all the stronger. Our clergy in general, gripped by the fever of morbid nationalism, fuel it even more in the nation (Khomyshyn, 1933: 32).

Bishop Khomyshyn called for “a break from the previous chauvinism and [Ukrainian] decaying nationalism, as well as with all nationalist and reckless leaders” (Khomyshyn, 1933: 89). Although he did not list the names of organizations and of people, it is known that he meant the nationalism under the sign of the OUN and related ideologues and activists.

Khomyshyn intertwined his views on Ukrainian nationalism with a wide-ranging reflection on the formation of the Greek Catholic clergy in the Second Polish Republic. In his opinion, it was too immersed in the flow of everyday life and material aspects, and therefore insufficiently resistant to the movements that were essentially contrary to the Christian spirit. No wonder then that Ukrainian nationalism of the interwar period did not follow the path chosen by Polish (National Democratic Party) nationalism, but adopted extreme social Darwinism, and even racism as its theoretical basis. Before World War II, it led to terror (Kulińska, 2009), and after it broke out, it resulted in genocide. It must be added here that the milieu of Bishop Khomyshyn did not make any significant waves and was generally neglected among Ukrainians, remaining a marginal group.

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Abstract: The article deals with the problem of Ukrainian nationalism and its significance in Polish-Ukrainian relations. It considers the role of the Ukrainian Nationalist Organization (OUN) established in 1929, and its militia, the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA), and the genocide committed by these organizations and the Ukrainian population supporting them during the World War II on Poles living in the south-eastern voivodeships of the Second Polish Republic. At the same time, it presents the scientific achievements of the recently deceased Ukrainian political scientist and historian, Associate Professor

Viktor Polishchuk, who, on over 2,579 pages of his works, documented the ideology, organizational structures and genocidal activity of those organizations which, according to the calculations of the Polish side, murdered about 200,000 Poles using the most atrocious methods. The article also lists very critical opinions of the Ukrainian bishop Khomyshyn on the contemporary Ukrainian nationalism, as well as detailed documentation of the crime of genocide carried out by the OUN and UPA on Poles as compiled within the five volumes listed in the bibliography.

Keywords: Ukrainian nationalism, works by Associate Professor Viktor Polishchuk, Bishop Grzegorz Khomyshyn's opinions

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